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William Lahey After the Revolution: Being Pragmatic
and Diana Ginn* and Functional in Canada's Trial
Courts and Courts of Appeal
In a 1998 decision, Pushpanathan v Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada
synthesized and revised the previous jurisprudence on "pragmatic and functional
analysis" - the approach used since the late 1980's to determine the appropriate
standard of deference in substantive review of administrative decision making.
The next year, in Baker v. Canada, the Court expanded the reach of the pragmatic
and functional analysis by applying it to the exercise of administrative discretion.
This paper examines approximately 275 lower court decisions to determine how
courts across Canada are responding to and implementing the doctrinal change
initiated by the Supreme Court. Patterns discerned in the detailed analysis of
cases are then used as a basis for reflections about the current approach to
substantive review and possible future directions.
Dans la decision Pushpanathan c. Canada, de 1998, la Cour Supr6me du Canada
a fait une synthese de la jurisprudence sur 'Tanalyse pragmatique et fonctionnelle"
- approche utilis6e depuis la fin des annees 1980 pour d6terminer le degr6 de
latitude appropri6 dans le contexte de l'examen materiel de la prise de d6cisions
administratives. Dus I'ann~e suivante, dans Baker c. Canada, la Cour a 6largi le
champ de I'analyse pragmatique et fonctionnelle a l'exercice de la discretion
administrative. Les auteurs examine environ 275 d6cisions des cours inferieures
du Canada pour determiner comment les cours canadiennes ont r6agi au
changement de doctrine pr6conis6 par la Cour supr6me et mis en application
les nouveaux principes qui en d6coulent. A partir des tendances qui se dessinent
au terme de cette analyse approfondie, les auteurs se livre a une r~flexion sur
I'approche courante vis-6-vis l'examen matdriel et trace les orientations futures.
* Professors Lahey and Ginn are members of the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University. We would
like to thank Aubrey Hilliard (LL.B. candidate, May, 2004) for her dedicated assistance. We also
wish to acknowledge the particularly helpful suggestions received from an external reviewer and
from our Dalhousie colleague, Professor Brian Donovan. We also benefited greatly in the finaliza-
tion of the paper from the lively discussion that followed our presentation of our findings and con-
clusions at a Faculty Seminar at Dalhousie Law School in March of 2003.
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Introduction
No serious observer of the engagement of the Supreme Court of Canada
with administrative law over the past twenty-five years would disagree
with the assessment that the Court has basically reinvented administrative
law in Canada, particularly relative to the review of the substance of
administrative decisions. Most or perhaps all of the same observers would
agree that the process of reinvention has been protracted, arduous,
complex, confusing and at times fractious.' Further still, there would
probably also be consensus among the same group of observers that the
doctrinal framework for substantive review has now entered into a period
of relative stability,2 but that many loose ends and unanswered questions
remain outstanding and that the Supreme Court seems poised to launch (or
I. For example, similar characterizations of the jurisprudence appear in H. Wade MacLauchlan,
"Transforming Administrative Law: The Didactic Role of the Supreme Court of Canada" (2001), 80
Can. Bar Rev. 281 and in David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 51
[Mullan, Administrative Law].
2. Lorne Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 2000-2001 Term" (2001) 15 Sup. Ct.
L. Rev. (2d) 3 1.
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to be launched upon) another phase of further and perhaps fundamental
doctrinal innovation.' Consensus along these general lines would prob-
ably be largely shared between those who applaud and those who regret
the direction in which the Court has taken the law. That there has been
extensive and fundamental change in administrative law is something with
which all administrative lawyers would likely agree.
In this paper, we approach the evaluation of the Supreme Court's
redesign of the substantive review branch of administrative law from a
somewhat different perspective and with a different methodology than is
the norm in the literature.4 Rather than concentrating solely on our own
understanding of what the Supreme Court has done to substantive review
doctrine, we have set out to understand how trial judges and the judges of
appellate courts beneath the Supreme Court of Canada understand what
the Supreme Court has done to substantive review doctrine.5 We have made
the assumption that the range of those understandings will be revealed in
how these judges apply the doctrine to specific cases. We have thus set out
to discover how the doctrine that has attracted so much attention from the
Supreme Court, and therefore from scholars, is being applied across the
general run of substantive review cases that must, of necessity, be finally
dealt with in the lower courts. In particular, we focus on the more than 275
substantive review cases decided in English between the decision of the
Supreme Court in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)' on June 3, 1998 and the Court's later decision in Suresh v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 7 on January 11, 2002.
At the most general level, we have two goals: first, to obtain an under-
standing of the role that Supreme Court doctrine appears to play in how
lower court judges approach substantive review questions, and second, to
3. As reflected by the complex tapestry of substantive and procedural review under administrative
and constitutional law in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3, 208 D.LR. (4th) 1, 2002 SCC 1 [Suresh]. See David W. Elliot, "Suresh and the Common
Borders of Administrative Law: Time for the Tailor?" (2002) 65 Sask. L. Rev. 469; Lorne Sossin,
"Developments in Administrative Law: The 2001-2002 Term" (2002) 18 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 41.
See also David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, "Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction:
Baker v. Canada" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193.
4. See however, MacLauchlan, supra note 1.
5. A similar approach was taken on by MacLauchlan, ibid. at 281-98. He "conducted a quick
search of decisions in which Baker (Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 IBakerl) has been cited since it was released in mid-
1999" (see MacLauchlan ibid. at 291). In this paper, we review a larger body of cases and we believe
we have undertaken a more in-depth review. Whereas a review of lower court behaviour was for
MacLauchlan only part of a broader review of the development of administrative law by the Su-
preme Court, it is our exclusive focus.
6. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan].
7. Suresh, supra note 3.
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determine whether the objectives that have guided the development of
doctrine in the Supreme Court, particularly curial deference, are also
guiding the application of that doctrine in other courts.
It is our view that more attention should be paid to the substantive
review jurisprudence of the lower courts, for a number of reasons. First, a
sort of operational audit of the law across a large cross-section of cases
seems overdue simply because of the degree of doctrinal change that has
taken place over the past twenty-five years. The sheer quantity and com-
plexity of doctrinal change that has been initiated by the Supreme Court
over the last twenty-five years makes a compelling case for wanting to
know more about how much success the lower courts have had in keeping
pace. To put it mildly, the evolution of the law of substantive review over
these years in the Supreme Court has been a difficult and challenging pro-
8. Even a highly schematic and partial outline of the process of doctrinal evolution demonstrates the
scope and complexity of that evolution. Curial deference has been extended from cases in which it is
expressly mandated by a privative clause to cases in which it is based primarily on judicial recognition of
the specialized expertise of administrative decision-makers. This extension can be tracked through Bell
Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television Commission), [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722,60 D.L.R. (4th) 682;
Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent ofBrokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557,114 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Pezim];
and Canada (Director ofInvestigation and Research) v. Southam (1996), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 144 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 [Southam]. The question that the pragmatic and functional analysis is engaged to answer has gone
through various formulations. It started as follows: "Did the legislator intend the question to be within
the jurisdiction conferred on the tribunal?" (see Union des employks de service, local 298 v. Bibeault,
[ 1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 95 N.R. 161 at para. 120 [Bibeault]) This question has often been stated as whether
or not the legislator intended to confer upon the administrative agency the right to be wrong on the
question in dispute (see e.g. La Forest J. in Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. NationalAutomobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 609 at para.
22). It became: "Was the question which the provision raises one that was intended by the legislator to be
left to the exclusive decision of the board?" (see Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers Compensation
Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890, 149 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at para. 18 [Pasiechnyk]) The pragmatic and func-
tional analysis is now applied in the Supreme Court as if the question were instead in the following form:
what is the appropriate standard of review here? (Southam, ibid.; Pushpanathan, supra note 6) The very
meaning of a jurisdictional question has been redefined from reflecting an inherent quality of
"jurisdictionality" to being instead a label that is applied to questions falling under one rather than under
other standards of review. In the process, it has been implied that issues going to jurisdiction are limited
to those that must be answered at the beginning of the proceeding (see Canadian Union ofPublic Employ-
ees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, 97 DL.R. (3d) 417 [C.UPE.]). It
was later said that the interpretation of any statutory provision that defines or limits powers at any stage of
the administrative process (see Bibeault, ibid.). Finally, it is now said to mean those issues on which the
administrative decision-maker must be correct under the pragmatic and functional analysis (see
Pushpanathan, supra note 6 at para. 28), while also including those questions that have an obvious juris-
dictional quality that can be identified without the pragmatic and functional analysis (see Regina Police
Assn. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 12000] 1 S.C.R. 360, 183 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 2000
SCC 14 [Regina Police]; Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 1 S.C.R. 342, 183 D.L.R. (4th) 1,
2000 SCC 13 [Nanaimo]). The distinctions between judicial review and appeal cases, between questions
of law, of mixed fact and law and of fact, and between legal interpretation and discretionary action, have
all been diminished in importance and changed in function. Whereas each distinction has at one time or
another been understood as a structural component of the law, dictating a mode of analysis and possible
outcomes that were distinct from that used and those available on the other side of each juridical fence,
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cess to follow.' As teachers of administrative law who annually watch stu-
dents struggle with the daunting corpus of Supreme Court decisions in the
area, we consider it valid to ask if lower court judges have managed to
keep pace in the ways they conceptualize, think about and analyze sub-
stantive review cases with all (or most) of the doctrinal shifts, retrench-
ments, refinements and restatements that are part of that jurisprudence. In
asking this question we acknowledge our skepticism as to the guidance
that can be provided by a body of doctrine that professes functional prag-
matism but that is as complex and as fluid as substantive review doctrine
has become.
Our second reason for deciding to find out more about how substantive
review doctrine is being applied in the lower courts is the large element of
contextual dependency (and therefore of adjudicative latitude) that is now
each now is simply a factor to be weighed with all others either for or against deference under a common
analytical framework that is pragmatic and functional. Instead of the binary choice between correctness
and patent unreasonableness, a spectrum of standards of review has been recognized that includes the
intermediate standard of review for simple unreasonableness and that, until recently, was thought to pos-
sibly include additional standards of review (see Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan [2003] 1 S.C.R.
247, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2003 SCC 20 [Ryan]). The stages of this process have been something like
this: the choice of available standards of review has gone from correctness and patent unreasonableness in
cases governed by a privative clause and correctness alone in all other cases, to correctness and patent
unreasonableness in cases involving a privative clause and a broader spectrum of standards of review that
included ordinary unreasonableness for appeals and judicial review in cases not involving a privative
clause, to correctness, unreasonableness and patent unreasonableness in all cases. The content of the
standards of review has also been fluid and it remains somewhat opaque. For example, patent unreason-
ableness was originally defined as connoting a decision based on an error so without rationality that its
irrationality was apparent on reading the decision (see C. UPE., ibid. at para 20, where Dickson J. asked,
"...was the Board's interpretation so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be rationally sup-
ported by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review?" See also the
dissent of Wilson J. in National Corn Growers v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, 74
D.L.R. (4th) 449 [National Corn Growers], and the definition of patent unreasonableness given by Cory
J. in Canada (A.G.) v. Public Service Association of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941 at 963-64, 101 D.L.R.
(4th) 673 [PS.A.C. cited to S.C.R.]). It was later clarified that application of this standard might require
detailed analysis of the rationality of each of the components of the reasoning lying beneath the decision
(see the majority opinion of Gonthier J. in National Corn Growers, ibid., and the majority opinion of
McLachlin J. in Lester (WW) (1978) Ltd. v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 740, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 389 [Lester]). It has
been further clarified that this is not inconsistent with the standard being one that limits the court to
intervening only if the perceived errors are so egregious that they appear more or less on the face of the
administrative decision (see Southam, ibid.). More recently, review of the exercise of discretion has been
moved from under a distinct analytical framework that looked for specific errors of reasoning (such as
arbitrariness or failure to consider relevant factors, rather than for a general quality of correctness, unrea-
sonableness or patent unreasonableness), to the same framework as questions of law, of fact and of mixed
law and fact, making discretionary action open to review under whatever standard of review is deter-
mined to be appropriate under pragmatic and functional analysis (see Baker, supra note 5). Now, the
Court appears to have decided that discretion will usually be reviewable only on a single standard of
review (patent unreasonableness) that arguably places challenges to exercises of discretion essentially
back where they started, albeit under changed terminology, which of course, creates a new set of doctrinal
possibilities and questions (Suresh, supra note 3).
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a core element of the doctrinal apparatus. To be sure, substantive review
law has always and unavoidably conferred wide latitude on each judge
called on to apply it. But the current law most certainly expands this
latitude, if only in the extent to which it recognizes, tolerates and indeed
celebrates contextualism. The standard of review is chosen from a spec-
trum of possible standards of review through a pragmatic and functional
analysis that functions, at best, as a set of guidelines for the standard of
review selection process.9 The result is that analysis is, and must be, over-
whelmingly driven by the circumstances particular to each case. If the
standard of review is unreasonableness or patent unreasonableness, the
judge decides what the difference between a mere reading of the decision
and a "somewhat probing" analysis of the decision will mean in the
specific context of the particular case before the court. Even if the stan-
dard of review is found to be the relatively straightforward one of correct-
ness, the judge derives flexibility and discretion from at least the implica-
tion found in Supreme Court jurisprudence that even review in accordance
with the standard of correctness can embody a certain degree of curial
deference (or at least of "benevolence")."°
The high degree of contextualism means that the impact of Supreme
Court doctrine on substantive review law is particularly dependent on how
the doctrine is understood and applied in the general run of cases that are
decided in the lower courts. The real effect of substantive review law is
therefore most likely to be fully revealed only in the patterns that are
produced by the cumulative effect of the outcomes reached in cases that
are likely to be more about application of the doctrine than in cases that are
about further refinement of the doctrine. One way of beginning to identify
and sort through these patterns is simply to read and analyze a large cross-
section of recent cases for the purpose of asking if, when and how the
judicial policies that inform the doctrinal framework are being implemented
"in the field". In characterizing these policies, some writing stresses that
9. Specifically, the pragmatic and functional analysis involves the court in determining legislative
intent as to whether the question is one for the agency or the courts by asking whether each of the
four categories of factors point to high or low deference. These categories are the presence or ab-
sence of a privative clause, the nature and purpose of the provision at issue and of the Act as a whole,
the relative expertise of the agency, the nature of the question and in particular, the issue of whether
the question falls within agency or judicial expertise.
10. Nanaimo, supra note 8. See Lorne Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 1999-
2000 Term" (2000) 13 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 45 at 68-73.
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the commitment to curial deference has become the defining feature of
contemporary substantive review law." If so, we believe a broad review
of lower court decisions is a necessary part of understanding how much of
the curial deference promised by the doctrine is actually delivered in cases
that are primarily about the application of the doctrine. Other writing puts
perhaps somewhat less emphasis on the binary choice between deference
and intervention as global policy alternatives. Instead, it emphasizes that
the objective of the doctrine is to facilitate sensitive calibration between
the scope and intensity of review and the factual and legal context of each
administrative decision that comes forward for review. On this view, the
doctrine is as much about mandating intervention where appropriate (es-
pecially to protect fundamental values of transcending importance, such
as those also protected in the Charter), as it is about mandating deference
in other situations. 2 Again however, we believe a broad cross-sectional
review of lower court decision-making is a necessary part of understand-
ing how, or if, this sophisticated calibration exercise is taking place, and
with what implications for the general extent and impact of judicial in-
volvement with administrative decision-making.
This brings us to our specific rationale for starting our exploratory ex-
pedition through the lower courts with cases decided immediately after
the Supreme Court decision in Pushpanathan. Apart from the need to start
somewhere, our main reason for taking Pushpanathan as our point of de-
parture is that it connects on several levels with the two rationales that we
have given for selecting a cross-section of lower court cases for review
and analysis. In our estimation, the opinion of Bastarache J. in
Pushpanathan can reasonably be taken as the beginning of the Supreme
Court's period of doctrinal stability and consensus, even though its influ-
ence is generally treated as greatly overshadowed by the seminal opinion
of L'Heureux-Dub6 in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Im-
migration),3 credibly described as the single most important administra-
11. For example, David J. Mullan, "Recent Developments in Administrative Law-The Apparent Tri-
umph of Deference!" (1999) Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 191.
12. For example, see David Dyzenhaus, "The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democ-
racy" in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province ofAdministrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997)
279; Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 3; David Dyzenhaus, "Constituting the Rule of Law: Fun-
damental Values in Administrative Law" (2002) 27 Queen's L.J. 445; MacLauchlan, supra note 1.
13. Supra note 5.
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tive law decision from the Supreme Court in the 1990s. 4 We say this be-
cause the significance of L'Heureux-Dub 's opinion, seen as a decision on
substantive review, lies significantly in the extension of the pragmatic and
functional analysis into the realm of discretionary action. But what was
extended was the pragmatic and functional analysis as restated in
Pushpanathan by Bastarache J. Through its comprehensiveness and in its
confirmation that the function and content of the framework were the same
in cases involving privative clauses as in other cases, the opinion of
Bastarache J. brought together and consolidated many of the distinct but
interrelated lines of development that were apparent in earlier cases. It has
also become the authoritative account of the pragmatic and functional ap-
proach for later Supreme Court cases, including Baker.15 By selecting
Pushpanathan as our starting point, we eliminate the necessity of consid-
ering cases decided upon the basis of earlier criteria. We maintain as well
our focus on cases decided under the long shadow of the complex process
of doctrinal evolution that we have summarized above, because
Pushpanathan can be seen as the culmination of that process and therefore
as embodying the earlier stages of doctrinal evolution. It is, in fact, a deci-
sion that seeks to consolidate, rationalize and refine that process. In apply-
14. D.J. Brown & J.M Evans, "Discretionary Justice: Reasons & Reasonableness", Case Comment
on Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), online: Canvasback Publishing Case
Comments <http://www.brownandevans.com/comment_01.html>. The significance of the charac-
terization is obvious from the stature of the source, as well as from a moment's reflection on the
other cases included in the 1990s, which must certainly qualify as the decade of administrative law's
greatest attention from the country's highest court. These cases include, of course, International
Woodworkers ofAmerica, Local 2-69 v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282,
68 D.L.R. (4th) 161; National Corn Growers, supra note 8; Lester, supra note 8 ; Pezim, supra note
8; Southam, supra note 8; Pasiechnyk, supra note 8; and the cases of the Cuddy Chicks line of
authority, including Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, 81
D.L.R. (4th) 121 [Cuddy Chicks]; and Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3
S.C.R. 854, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Cooper]. Of course, the Cuddy Chicks and Cooper line of cases
has now been overtaken by Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia
(Workers Compensation Board v. Laseur (2003), 310 N.R. 22, 4 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 2003 SCC 54.)
The combined significance of these cases can be captured by saying that many of them would not
only have changed how specific topics were taught in a course on administrative law but would have
significantly changed the organization of administrative law courses. See also Dyzenhaus & Fox-
Decent, supra note 3, where Baker is placed in the pantheon of great Canadian administrative law
decisions with C. UPE., supra note 8, Nicholson v. Haldimand Norfolk (Regional) Police Commis-
sioners (1978), 119791 S.C.R. 311, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 671 [Nicholson]; and Roncarelli v. Duplessis,
[ 1959] S.C.R. 121. See also David Mullan, "Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion)-A Defining moment in Canadian Administrative Law" (1997) 7 Reid sAdmin. Law 145.
15. Pushpanathan, supra note 6, was described by Evans J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane, [2001] 3 F.C. 185, 199 D.L.R. (4th)
130, 2001 FCA 104 at para. 60, as, "an important, comprehensive and general elaboration of the
pragmatic and functional analysis for determining the standard ofjudicial review of administrative
action."
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ing Pushpanathan, (if they do in fact apply it) lower courts therefore apply
a doctrinal framework that embodies the layers of doctrinal change that
we have argued warrant closer attention to the experience of lower courts.
More specifically, we use Pushpanathan as our point of departure
because, in our view, it is the case that best justifies our interest in deter-
mining how much of the total substantive review activity of the lower
courts is taking place under each of the standards of review. It is the
combined effect of Southam, Pushpanathan and Baker that makes each
standard of review a possibility at the outset of every pragmatic and
functional analysis, if only at a theoretical level. Or to put it somewhat
differently, these cases have together prevented the weight that is appro-
priately given in most cases to specific and recurring variables from hard-
ening into strict doctrinal boundaries that preclude contextualized analysis
from taking the judge wherever seems appropriate for that case on the full
spectrum. In our view, Pushpanathan is particularly significant in this
regard because of the significance of the traditional dichotomy between
cases involving statutes with and cases involving statutes without a
privative clause. If it is too much to say that Pushpanathan broke down
this dichotomy, it is certainly not too much to say that it greatly blurs it.
Thus, when this consideration is added to the significance of Pushpanathan
as the still prevailing articulation of the elements and methodology of the
pragmatic and functional analysis, the rationale for starting from
Pushpnathan is strong.
To some extent, we reversed this reasoning in deciding to end our read-
ing of the general run of lower court cases with those decided just before
the Supreme Court's ruling in Suresh, decided on January 11, 2002.
Pragmatically, stopping at Suresh gave us a large enough cross-section of
cases (approximately 275) to ensure a reasonably comprehensive picture
of how Supreme Court jurisprudence is now generally understood and
implemented in the lower courts. At the same time, the total number of
cases involved remained manageable for a detailed analysis that extended
beyond conclusions to underlying patterns of reasoning. But in addition,
we stopped at Suresh (at least for now), because it seemed to fit with our
decision to start with Pushpanathan. For just as Pushpanathan can be taken
as the culminating event in the development of substantive review law
considered as a separate branch of review, Suresh might arguably be taken
as the beginning of the law's next phase of development, in which the line
(if it still exists) between substantive and procedural review can be
expected to become increasingly porous. Further, as we mention above, it
is interesting that in Suresh the Supreme Court qualified Baker on pre-
cisely the point that makes Baker of a piece, at least as background for this
paper, with Southam and Pushpanathan; that is, in its openness to leaving
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the standard of review for discretion cases to individualized application of
the pragmatic and functional analysis. Instead, in Suresh, the Court ap-
pears to have retreated to the laying down of a general principle that would
direct judges in certain directions on the spectrum solely on the basis that
the review was of discretion.I6 By framing our parameters as we have, we
capture the lower court jurisprudence between Baker and Suresh and have
an opportunity to determine whether it has anything to say about whether
this retreat from Baker and, to some extent, from the general fluidity of the
pragmatic and functional analysis, was premature or timely.
In Part I, we introduce our reading and analysis of the cases. We begin
by first providing a summary of our findings that assumes familiarity with
Pushpanathan and Baker. We then discuss our findings in more detail,
dividing the discussion between the ways in which courts select, and then
apply, standards of review. In Part II, our discussion of standard of review
determination patterns is organized into sections that correspond to basic
elements of the Pushpanathan framework. Each of these is introduced by
a brief discussion of the relevant parts of Pushpanathan, both for those
who do not have this background but also to make our own understanding
of the framework clear to all readers. From this review, we piece together
a picture of general fidelity not only to the form but to the substance of the
Supreme Court's doctrinal framework. Our review demonstrates that Ca-
nadian courts generally do carry out substantive review by applying the
pragmatic and functional analysis to select a standard of review from the
spectrum of standards of review that is familiar from the Supreme Court
jurisprudence. In roughly two-thirds of the cases that we reviewed for this
study, the standard of review that results from the analysis limits the court
to review for unreasonableness or for patent unreasonableness. Moreover,
the application of the standard of review very frequently results in the
challenged administrative decision being left undisturbed, often even where
review has been for correctness. At the same time however, we find that
older patterns of analysis strongly persist under this general fidelity to the
unitary approach to substantive review that is now mandated by the
Supreme Court. In addition, we find that the analysis used to justify one
16. Supra note 3 at paras. 34-35. See however, the Court's more recent decision in Dr Q. v. College
of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 599, 2003
SCC 19 [Dr Q.], where, in the context of a general restatement of the pragmatic and functional
analysis, McLachlin C.J. noted at para. 24 that review for even abuse of discretion may range from
correctness to patent unreasonableness, citing and quoting from Mount Sinai Hospital Center v.
Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 200 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 2001
SCC 41 at para. 54.
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standard of review over another or to apply a standard of review either for
or against intervention is often very minimal and, sometimes, virtually
non-existent. We find, in other words, a certain roteness in the application
of the new doctrine that bespeaks the continuing influence of the kind of
formalism that the pragmatic and functional analysis was intended to, and
is often said to have, overcome.
In Part III, we step back from the detailed analysis of our cross-section
of lower court cases to offer some reflections on what the analysis tells us
about the efficacy and possibly the future of substantive review doctrine.
Some of these reflections relate to the continuing centrality to judicial
thinking of concepts ofjurisdictionality, particularly as regards questions
of law; others to the generally determinative importance that is still widely
placed on the presence or absence of a privative clause in the
conceptualization of substantive review questions; and others to the de-
gree of reliance that Canadian judges place on the availability of an inter-
mediate standard of review of unreasonableness as an alternative to the
extremes of review either for correctness or patent unreasonableness. But
beyond these large but specific issues, our aim in Part III is to reflect on
what significance should be attached to the prevalent tendencies of
Canadian courts, on the one hand, to deploy the language and concepts of
Supreme Court jurisprudence to reach outcomes that are largely consistent
with a posture of curial deference and, on the other hand, to do so fairly
frequently with little or even no analysis of how the doctrine is connected
to those outcomes by the circumstances of the particular administrative
decision before the court. This appears to us to be at least odd and perhaps
disconcerting given the supposed centrality of context to the doctrine that
is ostensibly being followed and applied. It suggests either that essential
steps in adjudicative analysis are not generally taking place or that some
of those analytical steps are often found not to be useful, necessary or
perhaps feasible by lower court judges. We conclude that doctrinal simpli-
fication may be in order, and that this simplification should at least in-
volve the consolidation of the unreasonableness simpliciter and the patent
unreasonableness standards of review.
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I. The Cases
1. Summary of Findings
Of the approximately 275 lower court cases that we reviewed, judicial
review cases outnumbered appeals almost 7:1. Approximately 40% of the
judicial review cases involved a privative clause. The following table shows
the number of times that courts used various standards of review, in these
approximately 275 decisions. The figures add up to 329 because of
decisions where a court applied different standards of review to different
issues within the same case.
Table: Distribution of Cases by Standard of Review
Standard of review identified by court Number of times used
Correctness 84
Between correctness and reasonableness simpliciter 7
Reasonablenesss simpliciter 107
Between reasonableness simpliciter and 11
patent unreasonableness
Patent unreasonableness 84
Unclear what standard applied 29
Test from s. 18.4(1) of Federal Court Act, re error of fact 3
Pre-Baker approach to discretion 4
2. Determining a Standard of Review
To begin with, our review of the cases makes it apparent that Canadian
judges generally accept the "unified field" theory of judicial review that
reaches its most advanced form in the combined force of Southam,
Pushpanathan and Baker. 17 The idea of a spectrum of standards of review
that encompasses correctness, reasonableness and patent unreasonableness
17. For example, we found few indications, either explicit or implicit, that older approaches (such
as error of law on the face of the record; review of factual findings on the basis that no legally
sufficient evidence existed to support them; or review of discretionary action for failure to take
account of relevant considerations) were being applied independently of the pragmatic and func-
tional analysis.
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is now generally accepted and applied. Most Canadian judges recognize
the pragmatic and functional approach as the point of departure for all
questions of substantive review, whether the issue at stake is characterized
as a question of law or fact or an exercise of discretion. Thus, in the wake
of the Supreme Court's decision in Baker which, for the first time, applied
the pragmatic functional analysis to a discretionary decision, Canadian
courts quickly adjusted their approach to the review of exercises of statu-
tory discretion. With relatively few exceptions, we found that after Baker,
such review was conducted by applying the pragmatic and functional analy-
sis to determine which of the general standards of review was applicable.
In other words, we found that the lower courts rapidly brought their
review of discretionary action into line (at least methodologically) with
their review of questions of law and of fact and of mixed law and fact.
Notwithstanding the general acceptance that the pragmatic and
functional analysis is applicable to substantive review, whatever the
nature of the question, this analysis was simply not performed in about
20% of the cases we reviewed. As indicated by the chart above, some
cases proceeded with review of discretion in accordance with the pre-Baker
approach or with review of a question of fact using the language of the
Federal Court Act. 8 Otherwise, failure to use the pragmatic and
functional analysis occurred most frequently in cases concerned with ques-
tions of law (sometimes also labeled by the court as jurisdictional issues).
In some of these cases, it appeared that courts may dispense with the
pragmatic and functional analysis because the jurisdictional quality of the
particular question of law was regarded as self-evident or at least
sufficiently obvious to permit such a characterization without the
pragmatic and functional analysis. In others (approximately 5% of the
cases), it was because the court regarded the administrative decision as so
obviously correct or so obviously in need of quashing that the outcome
would be the same, irrespective of the standard of review applied. In terms
of subject matter, failure to perform a pragmatic and functional analysis
occurred most frequently in immigration cases, where it was not unusual
for the court simply to decide (in effect, de novo) the issue that was before
the particular administrative decision maker (for instance the Convention
Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
or a visa officer).
In a smaller number of cases, the pragmatic and functional analysis
was referred to and even sometimes briefly performed, but it was unclear
18. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1,
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what standard of review had ultimately been chosen. Instead the court sim-
ply made reference to applying "some deference" or a level of scrutiny
that was "close to correctness".
Even where there was greater effort to carry out the pragmatic and
functional analysis leading to the selection of a specific standard of
review, there were frequently significant elements of superficiality and
even of roteness in how the courts performed this work. Often, consider-
ably more attention was paid to quoting passages from the decisions of the
Supreme Court that describe the framework and explain its rationale than
to the application of that framework to the specific statutory and factual
context of the decision being challenged. The standard of review often
appeared in the reasons for judgment immediately or shortly after the
quotations, as if it followed from and was even mandated by them and
required little further analysis or explanation.
Having said that, we found that the courts used the pragmatic and func-
tional framework, as required by Pushpanathan, to determine a standard
of review for each question that was answered by the administrative deci-
sion-maker, rather than at the level of the decision as a whole. They seemed
likewise to be generally aware of the possibility of different standards of
review being appropriate for different components of one administrative
decision.' 9 Presumably even before Pushpanathan, this was the case in at
least some contexts. 20 However, by stating, "[s]ome provisions within the
19. Examples include: Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
4 F.C. 269, 172 ET.R. 93 (T.D.) (decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division: law
(correctness), mixed fact and law (reasonableness)); Beazer East v. British Columbia (Environmen-
talAppeal Board) (2000), 84 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88, 36 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 195, 2000 BCSC 1698 (Environ-
mental Appeal Board: law (correctness), mixed fact and law (reasonableness)); Eggertson v. Alberta
Teachers 'Assn. (2001), 92 Alta. L.R. (3d) 82, 284 A.R. 139, 2001 ABQB 116 [Eggertson] (Profes-
sional Conduct Appeal Committee of the Alberta Teacher's Association: fact (patent unreasonable-
ness or reasonableness), mixed fact and law, and law (correctness)); Bradasch v. Yukon (Registrar of
Motor Vehicles) (2000), 6 M.VR. (4th) 86, 2000 YTSC 528 (Review officer under the Motor Vehicle
Act, R.S.Y 1997, c. 4: law (correctness), mixed fact and law, and fact (reasonableness)); Magill v.
Prince EdwardIsland (Minister of Community Affairs) (1999), 182 Nfld, & P.E.I.R. 144 (P.E.I. S.C.
(T.D.)) [Magill] (Human Rights Board of Inquiry: law (correctness), mixed fact and law, and fact
(reasonableness)); MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [1999] B.C.J.
No. 560 (S.C.) (QL) (Forest Appeal Board: law ("a standard approaching correctness" (ibid. at para
25)), mixed fact and law (reasonableness)), rev'd on other grounds (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 281, 76
B.C.L.R. (3d) 71, 2000 BCCA 351; 3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry) (2001),
[2002] 1 EC. 421 C.P.R. (4th) 449, 2001 FCA 254 [3430901 Canada]: (Applications Judge: law
(correctness), discretion (reasonableness simpliciter)), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001]
S.C.C.A. No. 537.
20. For instance, if a party alleged that a decision-maker had made errors of law and of fact, then
the latter were reviewed against the tests developed specifically for errors of fact. Similarly, where
a tribunal decision was protected by a privative clause, judicial review of a decision might involve
an application of the correctness standard to issues held to be jurisdictional and the standard of
patent unreasonableness to other issues falling within the tribunal's jurisdiction.
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same Act may require greater curial deference than others,"21 Bastarache
J. emphasized the possibility of more than one standard of review, when-
ever more than one error is alleged. This seems to follow logically from
identification of the nature of the question as one of the elements of the
pragmatic and functional analysis. Nevertheless, in about 10% of the cases
we reviewed, reliance was placed on earlier cases that applied the same
standard of review to the administrative body that made the decision (or to
like bodies), even where the earlier case concerned a decision involving
different questions of law.
It was also clear that not all lower courts have changed their
understanding ofjurisdictionality in light of Bastarache J.'s comment that
a jurisdictional question is simply one to which the standard of review of
correctness is applied. The cases reviewed reveal that a question's quality
as jurisdictional was still frequently thought of as being the reason for the
application of a correctness standard of review rather than as the label that
was applied to the question because it was reviewed for correctness. We
found that most often, jurisdictionality was a function of how the courts
applied the fourth factor of the pragmatic and functional framework (that
is, the nature of the question), particularly in relation to the second factor
(the relative expertise of the administrator). Specifically, questions that
were called jurisdictional tended to be those characterized as questions of
law of a more general nature. But there was also a continuing tendency to
associate jurisdictional questions with the idea that they are distinct in
functional terms. Unlike other questions of law, they were perceived by
courts as defining or limiting the scope of statutory authority, and the prag-
matic and functional analysis was applied to separate the questions that
perform this function from those that do not.
Whether or not courts continue to regard a privative clause as requir-
ing a division of all questions into either jurisdictional or non-jurisdic-
tional questions, they almost uniformly continue to regard such clauses as
mandating either maximum deference or no deference. Thus, where the
legislation under consideration included a privative clause, in the vast
majority of cases either correctness or patent unreasonableness was the
chosen standard of review, even when the courts dutifully referred to the
full spectrum of standards of review, including the intermediate standard
of reasonableness. Thus only about 5% of the cases in which reasonable-
ness was selected as the standard of review involved a privative or finality
clause. Where courts engaged in judicial review of an administrative deci-
21. Pushpanathan, supra note 6 at para. 28.
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sion not protected by a privative clause, the reasonableness standard was
applied most frequently (in approximately 50% of the cases), followed by
the correctness standard, with the standard of patent unreasonableness
being applied far less frequently.2 2 Where the legislation before the court
provided for an appeal, the standard of review was almost always either
correctness or reasonableness, although patent unreasonableness was
applied on occasion.23
Our review also found that substantive review cases during the four
years covered by our study were more or less evenly distributed across the
three standards of review. Almost 80% of the cases that applied the
standard of correctness involved the review of an administrative decision
maker's interpretation of law. Conversely, once an issue was identified as
a question of law, it became highly likely that the correctness standard
would be applied. The legal question was explicitly characterized as a
jurisdictional question in a significant minority of these cases and when
this occurred it was (not surprisingly) always the case that the standard of
review was identified as correctness. Thus, there is a tendency among lower
courts to equate questions of law with correctness review. Conversely,
review for correctness was only rarely applied to questions that were
characterized as factual determinations, to those characterized as being
mixed law and fact or to decisions that were characterized as discretion-
ary. A few examples of each of these applications of the standard were
found, but all together these examples account for less than 5% of the
cases in which the standard of correctness was selected. The intermediate
standard of review for simple unreasonableness was applied in roughly
equal proportions to cases found to involve the review of factual findings,
those involving the review of findings of mixed fact and law and to those
22. For example, in the following cases the standard of patent unreasonableness was applied on
judicial review involving legislation without a privative clause: A.B.Z. v. Canada (Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 533 [A.B.Z.] (where it was applied to a question of fact before
the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board); Apotex v. Alberta (2001), 16 C.YR.
(4th) 208, 302 A.R. 80, 2001 ABQB 922 [Apotex] (where it was applied to a question of "scientific
and medical complexity" (ibid. at para. 85) before an expert committee on drug evaluation); AVS
Technologies v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction RightsAgency, 257 N.R. 283, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 68
(Fed. C.A.) [AVS Technologies] (where it was applied to a question of law before the Copyright
Board); BC Landscape & Nursery Assn. v. Canada (A.G.) (2000), 186 ET.R. 62, 35 C.E.L.R. (N.S.)
169 (T.D.) (where it was applied to discretionary decision making by the Minister of Agriculture).
23. In terms of sheer numbers the standard of correctness showed up most frequently in judicial
review (as opposed to appeal) decisions. This is largely a function of the fact that, overwhelmingly,
substantive review of administrative decisions is performed by way of judicial review, not appeals.
When this is taken into account it is clear that a significantly higher percentage of appeal decisions
invoke the correctness standard than is the case on judicial review.
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involving the review of discretionary decisions. Indeed, approximately one
half of the cases that were identifiably concerned with challenges to
discretionary decisions were dealt with under this standard of review. The
reasonableness standard of review was applied relatively infrequently in
cases found to involve a pure question of law.24 A roughly similar pattern
emerged among the cases that were reviewed for patent unreasonableness.
This standard was applied to fairly equal numbers of cases concerned with
questions of fact, questions of mixed law and fact, and the review of
discretionary decisions. In contrast, it was applied less frequently when
the case was characterized as concerning a question of law. Patent
unreasonableness was also applied in a number of cases where the courts
did not identify the nature of the issue before the administrative decision-
maker and, occasionally, where the issue was simply described as being
"within [the] 'home territory' [of the Board]"25 or "squarely within the
jurisdiction of [the Board]."26
Overall, we found that the pragmatic and functional approach was
widely invoked and was carefully applied in some cases; we also found
that it was frequently applied only in a rather pro forma way. A single
factor was often taken to justify the selection of one standard rather than
another, or the standard of review was taken to be "obvious" given the
identity of the decision-maker, or was simply asserted as being consistent
with the pragmatic and functional analysis or the general principle of
deference. Further, even where courts profess to use the Pushpanathan
and Baker approach to pragmatic and functional analysis, elements of older
approaches are frequently still evident. Finally, we found that the
pragmatic and functional approach was not used at all in a significant
proportion of cases.
24. For instance the reasonableness standard was applied to questions of law in Alberta (Minister of
Municipal Affairs) v. Alberta (Municipal Government Board) (2000), 272 A.R. 36, 28 Admin. L.R.
(3d) 298, 2000 ABQB 639 [Alberta (Minister of Municipal Affairs)]; and Halifax Employers 'Assn.
v. Nova Scotia (Workers'Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2000 NSCA 86. In Northwest Territories
v. Union of Northern Workers, [2001] 7 WW.R. 374, 35 Admin. L.R. (3d) 104, 2001 NWTSC 27
[Union of Northern Workers], it was less clear which standard was applied to the decision of a labour
arbitrator, but it appears to have been reasonableness.
25. Assiniboine South Teachers 'Assn. ofthe Manitoba Teachers 'Society v. Assiniboine South School
Division No. 3 (2000), 187 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 148 Man. R. (2d) 1, 2000 MBCA 9, leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 435.
26. Ontario (A. G.) v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 77, 195 D.L.R.
(4th) 376 (C.A.) at para. 11.
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3. Applying the Standards of Review
One striking observation regarding the lower courts' application of the
various standards of review is that the decision of the administrative
decision maker was upheld at least two thirds of the time 7.2 Beyond that,
our review suggested a number of other trends as to how lower courts
apply the standard of review, once determined, to the issues before them.
First, it was noteworthy that in a significant number of decisions the courts
provided little or no discussion of what the various levels of scrutiny mean
and even where there was such discussion it usually consisted of quotes
from previous Supreme Court cases rather than commentary from the lower
court judges themselves. Equally striking was our sense that despite the
importance ascribed by the Supreme Court to determining the appropriate
standard of review, it was not always clear from reading lower court
decisions whether the choice of a particular standard of review actually
affected the result of the appeal or review. Finally, there was little consis-
tency in the jurisprudence as to whether a deferential standard of review
was seen simply as allowing an administrative decision-maker more
latitude to deviate from the correct answer or whether choosing such a
standard of scrutiny reflected a recognition that, in a particular context,
there may not have been a single "correct" answer. In a significant number
of cases, the former seemed to be the operating assumption, yet not all
courts have taken this approach.
II. Detailed Analysis
1. Introduction
Having given a brief overview of our findings, we now examine in more
detail how the lower courts have applied the current approach to substan-
tive review of administrative decision-making. Again, we divide this into
two subsections with a major focus on determining the standard of review
and briefer comments on the application of the standard of review. In the
first of these subsections, we analyse how lower courts are applying the
doctrinal framework that can be said to have crystallized with
Pushpanathan, and to have been extended by Baker into the review of
exercises of discretion. First of all, we examine the consistency and thor-
oughness with which the pragmatic and functional analysis is applied and
carried out. Then we look more specifically at how the courts apply the
analysis in the context of a privative clause. We then focus on how the
27. In fact, when immigration and refugee cases were removed from the equation, the likelihood
that the board or tribunal's decision would be upheld moved to between 70 and 75%.
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courts address the relationship between expertise and the other factors of
the pragmatic and functional analysis. Next, we look specifically at the
application of the pragmatic and functional analysis in the review of find-
ings of fact and then in the review of discretionary decision-making. In
each case, we preface our examination of the application of the doctrine in
the lower courts with a brief discussion of our understanding of what the
Supreme Court has said to guide the courts in respect of each of these
aspects of the doctrinal framework.
2. Determining the Standard of Review
a. Application of the Pragmatic and Functional Analysis
Until the decision of the Supreme Court in Pezim,28 the use of the prag-
matic and functional approach was limited to determining whether or not
an issue was jurisdictional in cases involving a privative clause. It was
well established that the standard of review that applied to jurisdictional
questions was correctness while the standard of review that applied to ques-
tions within jurisdiction was patent unreasonableness. In Pezim, lacobucci
J. adapted the pragmatic and functional analysis for determining the stan-
dard of review in a statutory appeal that applied to questions of law. He
concluded that the appropriate standard of review was one that was defer-
ential and intermediate between the standards of patent unreasonableness
and of correctness. In Southam,29 Iacobucci J. built on Pezim, again for the
purpose of answering the question of the appropriate standard of review in
the case of a statutory appeal. He also gave a name to the intermediate
standard of review that the Court had applied in Pezim, calling it the rea-
sonableness simpliciter standard of review. Also, Southam elaborated on
the concept of a spectrum of standards of review introduced in Pezim,
confirming that it included at least the three standards of review: correct-
ness, reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness. In choosing
a standard of review from the full spectrum for a case that did not involve
a privative clause, lacobucci J. left open the possibility that the patent un-
reasonableness standard of review might apply even where review was
not limited to jurisdictional error. While lacobucci J. doubted the appro-
priateness of review for patent unreasonableness in appeal cases, he nev-
ertheless selected a standard of review for that case from a spectrum that
included patent unreasonableness.3"
28. Supra note 8.
29. Supra note 8.
30. Ibid. at paras. 31-32, 54-55.
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In Pushpanathan,1 Bastarache J. stated that in a case ofjudicial review
involving a privative clause, the pragmatic and functional analysis should
be applied for the same purpose as in Pezim and Southam, that is, to
determine the appropriate standard of review, rather than to differentiate
between questions of and questions within jurisdiction. He also confirmed
that the standard of review in review under a privative clause was to be
chosen from the full spectrum of standards of review set out in Southam.
The choice in judicial review under a privative clause was therefore not
limited, as it had been previously, to that between correctness and patent
unreasonableness. Thus, the possibility was recognized that cases that might
previously have been reviewed either for correctness or patent unreason-
ableness might in the future be reviewed under the intermediate standard
of review. Particularly important in this regard were the comments of
Bastarache J. to the effect that although the presence of a privative clause
will normally entail a high level of deference and therefore review only
for patent unreasonableness, the privative clause can be outweighed and a
more interventionist standard applied if other factors point strongly
toward lower deference.3"
Additionally, Bastarache J. in Pushpanathan provided a comprehen-
31. The issue in Pushpanathan, supra note 6, was the interpretation of Article 1F(c) of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6, incorporated into
Canadian law by section 2(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2. Article 1F(c) provides that
any person who is "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations" is
excluded from claiming refugee status. In deciding Mr. Pushpanathan's application for convention
refugee status, the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board held that, having been convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic, Mr. Pushpanathan had
committed acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Therefore the Board
rejected his application. Mr. Pushpanathan applied for judicial review of this decision. The Federal
Court-Trial Division, upheld the Board's decision, but certified that there was a serious question of
general importance involved, which permitted Mr. Pushpanathan to appeal to the Federal Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal unanimously. At the Supreme Court of Canada,
Bastarache J., writing for the majority of the Court, identified three key issues:
First, what is the standard of review to be applied to the decision of the Immigration and
Refugee Board? Second, how do the rules of treaty interpretation apply to the determina-
tion of the meaning of Article 1F(c)? Third, does the appellant's act of drug trafficking
fall within the definition of "acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations"? (Pushpanathan, ibid. at para. 22)
While the Court divided on the third issue, with the majority holding that conspiracy to traffic a
narcotic was not a violation of Article 1F(c), the Court was unanimous regarding the applicable
standard of review. Applying a four-part pragmatic and functional analysis, which considered the
existence of a privative clause, the purpose of the Act and the relevant provisions within it, the
expertise of the Board, and the nature of the issue before it, the Court concluded that the Board
should be held to a standard of correctness in interpreting Article I F(c) of the Convention. Of pri-
mary importance in the Court's analysis was the determination that the expertise of the Convention
Refugee Determination Division was largely limited to making findings of fact, while the question
of whether narcotics trafficking was an act contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations was a general question of law with important human rights implications.
32. Pushpanathan, ibid. at para. 30.
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sive restatement of the elements of the pragmatic and functional analysis.
It is now authoritatively established that the factors to be considered are
the presence or absence of a privative clause; the expertise of the adminis-
trative decision maker relative to that of the court, with both defined
relative to the question at issue; the purpose of the Act as a whole and of
the particular provisions that were applied in making the challenged
decision; and the nature of the question and, in particular, whether it was a
question of law or of fact and if a question of law, whether of a specific or
general nature. As in earlier cases, Bastarache J. noted that expertise is the
most important of the factors, but stressed at several points that no one
factor is determinative but that rather, the combined effect of all of the
factors will determine the standard of review. An indication of the kind of
nuanced inquiry that this calls for is indicated by the various comments of
Bastarache J. concerning the significance to be attached to the nature and
scope of questions of law. Under "Nature of the Question," there will be
less deference the more general the proposition that was decided by the
administrative decision maker. But it is also said that findings of great
precedential value with determinative import for future decisions may at-
tract deferential review if that is indicated by other factors, such as the
creation of a comprehensive legislative scheme, the creation of a highly
specialized administrative decision maker, and the presence of a strong
privative clause. Under "Expertise," the courts may show considerable
deference even where highly generalized statutory interpretation is taking
place where the statute being interpreted is the decision maker's constitu-
ent legislation. Further, under "Purpose of the Act as a Whole, and the
Provision in Particular," the appropriateness of a lower standard of review
can be indicated by the applicability of legal principles that are vague,
open-textured, or that involve a "multi-factored balancing test." This im-
pression of the need for a highly nuanced inquiry is, of course, quickly
validated by even a reading of the cases in which the Supreme Court has
itself applied this methodology, whether before or after Pushpanathan.
Thus, from Pushpanathan forward, it could be said that the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court required substantive review proceedings to
begin with a determination of the standard of review in all settings except
the exercise of discretion. The latter were, of course, brought under the
same principle by Baker.33 In that case, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
not only brought the review of discretionary action under the pragmatic
and functional analysis but also proceeded to select reasonableness sim-
33. Supra note 5.
280 The Dalhousie Law Journal
pliciter as the appropriate standard of review on the clear assumption that
correctness or patent unreasonableness might be the appropriate standard
in other discretion cases. It can therefore be said that since Pushapnathan,
(and since Baker, for review of exercises of discretion) the decisions of the
Supreme Court have specified the availability in all settings of the full
spectrum of standards of review, including at least correctness, reason-
ableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness. It can further be said
that since Pushpanathan (and since Baker, for review of exercises of dis-
cretion) the Supreme Court has mandated the universal application, across
all settings, of a consistently structured pragmatic and functional analysis
as the methodology for selecting a standard of review for each of the ques-
tions raised by a challenged administrative decision.
Turning then to the lower court decisions, we found that Pushpanathan
was almost universally cited where a pragmatic and functional analysis
was undertaken by the lower courts, whether on judicial review applica-
tions or on statutory appeals and that, in such cases almost every court
listed the four factors set out by Bastarache J. 34 Differences appear, how-
ever, in terms of the degree of thoroughness with which the pragmatic and
functional analysis was applied. Certainly quite a number of the cases gave
at least some consideration to each of the four elements of the analysis
even if, especially in the presence of a privative clause, there was
frequently also a tendency to blend this discussion with the pre-
Pushpanathan approach. In a number of cases, however, the portion of the
decision devoted to the determination of the standard of review was very
brief or somewhat confusing. In several cases, determining the appropri-
ate standard of review was not even seen to be of any real significance.
Brevity on the issue of the appropriate standard of review was particu-
larly apparent in a number of decisions under the Immigration Act.3" At
times, there may be an obvious precedential reason for such brevity; for
instance where the Refugee Division of the Immigration Board made a
decision regarding a general question of law which did not fall within its
34. One of the exceptions is Anderson v. Bear Hills Pork Producers Ltd. (2000), 198 Sask. R. 229,
2000 SKQB 505 [Anderson], involving judicial review of a decision of the Executive Director of the
Saskatchewan Labour Standards Board as to whether certain employees were exempt from the Labour
Standards Act, R.S.C. 1978, c. L-1. Citing Bibeault, supra note 8, and Pezim, supra note 8, but not
Pushpanathan, supra note 6, the Court stated: "In interpreting the provisions of the Act to determine
the proper scope of his jurisdiction, the Executive Director's assessment of his jurisdiction is re-
viewable on the standard of correctness." (Anderson, ibid. at para. 12)
35. See e.g. Bermudez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 191 ET.R. 72,
24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 65 (T.D.) [Bermudez]; Chan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion) (1999), 166 F.T.R. 271, 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) II (T.D.), rev'd [2000] 4 F.C. 390, 190 D.L.R. (4th)
128 (C.A.) [Chan]; Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327,
184 D.L.R. (4th) 14 (C.A.) [Klinko].
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areas of specialized expertise, it was hardly surprising that the court
simply referred to Pushpanathan as authority for applying a correctness
standard on review. In some immigration or refugee cases, however, there
was a reference to Pushpanathan, but little or no discussion of how the
pragmatic and functional analysis pointed to one standard of review rather
than to another. In such cases the identification of the appropriate stan-
dard of review was almost formulaic.
For instance, in Lintner v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immi-
gration),3 6 the Court characterized the question of whether to issue a visitor's
visa as one of discretion, and as involving issues of fact and mixed fact
and law, then stated, "[flollowing Baker ... and Pushpanathan ... the stan-
dard of review for such discretionary decisions is reasonableness". The
Court went on to say, "[f]or simple findings of fact, the standard is, in my
opinion, also reasonableness."37 In Chaudhry v. Canada (Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration),38 a case involving judicial review of a decision
of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration
and Refugee Board, the Court stated that in Southam, "the Supreme Court
of Canada held that questions of mixed fact and law are to be reviewed on
the standard of reasonableness simpliciter," and then immediately con-
cluded, "I would be of the opinion that the same standard should apply to
the review of factual findings."39
We describe this approach as formulaic because of the lack of consid-
eration given to context. Instead, it appears to have been assumed that
different kinds of issues (discretion and fact in Lintner, mixed fact and law
and fact in Chaudhry) should be held to the same standard of review, what-
ever the expertise of the administrative decision-maker with regard to the
particular question before it. The standard of review applied by the
Supreme Court in cases such as Baker and Southam was treated as a
virtual rule of law that a particular level of scrutiny must automatically
apply in a wide range of contexts.
Paucity of analysis is also found outside the realm of immigration cases.
For instance, in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Canadian Forest
Products Ltd.,4° the Court referred to the Pushpanathan criteria, then stated,
"...such an elaborate process is unnecessary in what I think was a clear
36. [2000] EC.J. No. 99 (T.D.) [Lintner].
37. Ibid. at para. 8. See also Powar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000),
180 F.T.R. 271 (T.D.), aff'd (2001), 274 N.R. 360, 2001 FCA 153.
38. [2000] EC.J. No. 708 (T.D.) [Chaudhry]. For a similar approach see also Mahmood v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 737 (T.D.) [Mahmood].
39. Chaudhry, ibid. at para. 12.
40. (2000), 141 B.C.A.C. 100, 2000 BCCA 456.
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misrepresentation of the Board's own powers."41 Only slightly more dis-
cussion is offered in National Ballet of Canada v. Glasco et al.,42 where
the Court listed the four factors identified by Bastarache J., then discussed
the appropriate standard of review in one paragraph:
Here, the appeal concerns a question of law only. There is no greater
expertise in the arbitrator than the courts in the application of the law
relating to interlocutory injunctions. Therefore, the standard of review is
correctness .41
A typical approach that provides slightly more analysis, but still deals
with the choice of standard of review rather briskly, was found in Brown v.
Workers Compensation Board,4 where a fairly brief paragraph was
devoted to each of the four Pushpanathan factors. At issue was the refusal
of the Workers Compensation Board to place any physiatrists on a list of
specialists from which a medical review panel would be established to
determine whether the applicant was entitled to benefits. The entire prag-
matic and functional analysis was as follows:
Section 22(2) is a true and strong privative clause. It is a clear indication
of the legislature's intention that the court not intervene where the Board
has made a determination.
The expertise of the Board is beyond question. It is a specialized
tribunal and does nothing but adjudicate questions that arise under the
Act. It has experience and knowledge which qualify it to carry out the
demands of the Act. The expertise has received judicial recognition. See
Pasiechnyk et al. v. Procrane Inc. et al., [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890; 216 N.R.
1; 158 Sask. R. 81; 153 W.A.C. 81.
The purpose of the Act is to create a system of compensation for
workers who have been injured. While it is a no-fault system it is still
necessary to have a mechanism to deal with questions which relate to
entitlement to compensation. At the same time the process should pro-
ceed expeditiously and with minimal expense. All of this can be better
achieved by a tribunal than a court. With this in mind the legislature in
s.22(1) provided that "... all matters and questions arising from this
Act..." are to be determined by the Board.
41. Ibid. at para. 18.
42. (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 230, 186 D.L.R. (4th) 347 (Sup. Ct. J.) [Glasco].
43. Ibid. at para. 43. See also College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia v. British
Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (2001), 90 B.C.L.R. (3d) 299, 2001 BCSC 726,
rev'd on other grounds (2002), [2003] 2 W.W.R. 279, 9 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 2002 BCCA 665, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 83.
44. (1999), 176 Sask. R. 72 (Q.B.) [Brown]. See also Moresby Explorers Ltd. v. Canada (AG.),
[2001] 4 EC. 591, 208 F.T.R. 189, 2001 FCT 780 [Moresby].
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Finally, the problem which confronted the Board was that of decid-
ing what medical speciality would be included in the list of specialists.
That decision was mandated by s. 62 of the Act and no discretion rests
with the Board. It must simply prepare the list as it deems appropriate.
In the end, upon a consideration of the various factors, it is my con-
clusion that a great degree of deference should be accorded the decision
of the Board. It follows that the standard of review should be patent
unreasonableness .
45
There were also a number of cases where the court made confusing or
contradictory statements in the course of its pragmatic and functional analy-
sis. For instance, in Kirchmeir v. Edmonton (City),46 a case which involved
judicial review of a decision of the Edmonton Police Commission to hold
an in camera meeting, the Court discussed the four factors from
Pushpanathan, quoted a fairly lengthy passage from Baker, and then stated:
Looking at the four factors identified by the Court, in my view, the rea-
sonableness test ought to be adopted. It is clearly the least onerous stan-
dard of review which works in favour of the applicant and is predicated
on the argument that under the circumstances, minimal deference ought
to be shown by the Court towards decisions of the Commission as the
Commission is not protected by a privative clause and is not making
adjudicative decisions.47
The standard of review chosen by the Court in Kirchmeir seems quite
appropriate: several factors of the pragmatic and functional analysis did
point to deference (the Commission was recognized as engaged in balanc-
ing various interests and as having expertise in that balancing, and the
decision did not affect specific entitlements) while the fact that there was
no privative clause might dissuade a court from going as far as the patently
unreasonable standard. However, the reasoning in the paragraph quoted is
rather confusing. It is not clear why reasonableness was described as "the
least onerous standard of review which works in favour of the applicant"
or as involving "minimal deference," nor is it clear why the fact that the
Commission was "not making adjudicative decisions" was seen as a factor
favouring less deference.48
45. Brown, ibid. at paras. 11-15.
46. (2001), 294 A.R. 306, 20 M.P.L.R. (3d) 44, 2001 ABQB 107 [Kirchmeir].
47. Ibid. at para. 39.
48. Ibid.
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In Medeiros v. Ginoogaming First Nation,49 a case involving the
decision of an Indian band council, the Court stated that the issue being
reviewed was a question of law, then went on to say that because the ques-
tion had to be "appreciated in a specific factual context," this called for a
"lower standard of deference."5 If this means that the court should there-
fore be less deferential, this seems rather surprising, since usually the more
a legal issue is interlaced with questions of fact, the more deference is
called for.
In a number of other cases, the court indicated that identifying the
appropriate standard of review was not really necessary, because the
decision was correct and would therefore pass any level of scrutiny. Thus,
in 2962188 Manitoba Ltd. (c. o. b. Concord Inn) v. Manitoba (Liquor Con-
trol Commission),5' the Court of Appeal did not perform a pragmatic and
functional analysis, although Pushpanathan and Bibeault were cited. In
reviewing a decision of the Liquor Commission to suspend a liquor
licence, the Court stated, "Not only was the Commission entitled to act as
it did, it was correct in so doing. 52 A similar approach was found in Rahim
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),53 which involved an
appeal from a decision of a citizenship judge, where the Court simply stated:
After having reviewed the decision of the citizenship judge and
the materials filed with the Court, I am of the opinion that the
decision of the Citizenship Judge was correct.
Although I have found that the Citizenship Judge was correct,
it may well be that in light of the decision in ... [Southam] and in
... [Pushpanathan], the standard of review may be more deferen-
tial than correctness but it is not necessary that I make that finding
in this case.
54
In Readyfoods, a Division of Golden Valley Farms v. United Food and
Commercial Workers'Union, Local 832,11 on judicial review of an arbitra-
tion award, the Court remarked that before considering the law on standard
49. (2001), 213 F.T.R. 221, 39 Admin. L.R. (3d) 50, 2001 FCT 1318 [Medeiros]. In this case, the
applicants challenged a decision of Band Council which excluded them from receiving benefits
under a Settlement Agreement entered into by Council.
50. Ibid. at para. 75.
51. (1999), 138 Man. R. (2d) 79 (C.A.).
52. Ibid. atpara. 12.
53. (2000), 183 FT.R. 139 (T.D.) [Rahim].
54. Ibid. atparas. 15-16.
55. (1999), 140 Man. R. (2d) 204 (Q.B.) [Readyfoods].
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of review, it would be "useful to review what the arbitrator actually did. '56
After this review, the Court concluded that the arbitrator's interpretation
of the relevant legislation had been correct, and later the Court stated "it is
clear the arbitrator's interpretation is not only reasonable but correct.
57
In Northwest Territories v. Union of Northern Workers,5" on judicial
review of a decision of a labour arbitrator, the Court held that the test of
reasonableness simpliciter should probably be applied; however, the Court
went on to state: "But I need not be definitive on that point.. .The reason
for that is that I think the arbitrator's decision was correct...and if it meets
that test then it obviously meets any other test one wishes to apply.159
Conversely, and from the other end of the spectrum, Canadian courts
have sometimes concluded that they do not have to make a definitive
selection of a standard of review because the decision was so unreason-
able that it could not withstand any level of scrutiny. Thus, in Canadian
Forest Products Ltd. v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),60 a case
which involved judicial review of a decision of the Ministry of Forests
regarding stumpage fee assessments, the Court stated:
While I tend to the view that there is a continuum in the standard of
review from patently unreasonable to correctness and that an analysis
such as that described by Bastarache J. in Pushpanathan would lead to
the application in this case of a standard approaching correctness, I do
not consider such an analysis to be necessary.
Wherever on the spectrum between error and unreasonableness the stan-
dard is found, the Board's decision cannot stand 1
56. Ibid. at para. 11.
57. Ibid. at para. 25. The Court also stated: "If I am wrong in my assessment of the correctness of
the arbitrator's position, then it is my view that on the appropriate standard of review, the arbitrator's
decision should not be disturbed." (ibid. at para. 28) Only then did the court refer to Pushpanathan
and briefly discuss the expertise of the arbitrator. The Court then concluded:
It is my view that the standard of review should require the applicant to show that the
arbitrator's decision is patently unreasonable. If I am wrong and the standard of review
should not be quite that deferential, it should not move on this spectrum all the way to the
standard of correctness (ibid. at para 34).
58. Supra note 24.
59. Ibid. at para. 15. See also Bertold v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999),
175 ET.R. 195, 2 Imm. L.R. (3d) 46 (T.D.). A similar approach was taken in North Central Health
District v. Saskatchewan (Government and Employees Union) (1999), 176 Sask. R. 161 (Q.B.), aff'd
(1999), 180 Sask. R. 81 (C.A.) [North Central Health District], involving judicial review of a labour
board decision.
60. (1998), 55 B.C.L.R. (3d) 221, 9 Admin. L.R. (3d) 66 (C.A.) [Canadian Forest Products].
61. Ibid. at para. 16-17.
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In Joey s Delivery Service v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety
and Compensation Commission),6 2 the Appeals Tribunal of the Workplace
Health, Safety and Compensation Commission held that drivers for take-
out deliveries were employees for the purposes of the Workplace Health,
Safety and Compensation Act. 63 On appeal, the New Brunswick Court of
Appeal stated:
One way of avoiding the standard of review issue altogether is to admit
that the outcome of this appeal is not dependent on isolating the proper
standard of review. In my respectful view, the Appeals Tribunal's deci-
sion is so fundamentally flawed that it could not survive even if the most
deferential of standards were applied.'
We also found examples of cases where the court regarded a thorough
pragmatic and functional analysis as necessary in order to determine the
standard of review. For example, in Saftner v. Northwest Territories and
Nunavut (Workers' Compensation Board),65 a significant portion of the
decision was devoted to a fairly detailed discussion of each of the four
Pushpanathan criteria. In Garbo Creations v. Harriet Brown & Co.,66 the
Federal Court Trial Division heard an appeal from a decision of the Regis-
trar of Trademarks regarding the likelihood of confusion between two trade-
marks. Although earlier cases had set the standard of review for the Reg-
istrar at correctness, with perhaps some room for deference on fact-find-
ing, the Court stated:
In my opinion the standard of review applied to the Registrar's findings
of confusion needs to be reformulated to take account of the pragmatic
and functional analysis developed in contemporary administrative law




The Court proceeded to a careful review of each of the elements of the
Pushpanathan analysis. Similarly, in Canada (Commissioner of Competi-
62. (2001), 201 D.L.R. (4th) 450, 239 N.B.R. (2d) 300, 2001 NBCA 17, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 425, 250 N.B.R. (2d) 400 [Joey 's Delivery Service].
63. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-14.
64. Joey 's Delivery Service, supra note 62 at para. 23.
65. (2001), 32 Admin. L.R. (3d) 212, 2001 NWTSC II [Saftner].
66. (1999), 3 C.P.R. (4th) 224, 23 Admin. L.R. (3d) 153 (F.C.T.D.) [Garbo Creations].
67. Ibid. at para. 16.
68. Supra note 15.
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lion) v. Superior Propane," the Court conducted a thorough analysis
before concluding that an appeal from the competition tribunal should be
held to a correctness standard.
b. The Impact of a Privative Clause
Until Pushpanathan, it was accepted doctrine that where the decision of a
board or tribunal was challenged on the basis of an alleged error of law,
the existence of a privative clause necessitated the classification of the
issue in question as either "jurisdictional" or as "falling within jurisdic-
tion". Thus, in pre-Pushpanathan doctrine, the pragmatic and functional
analysis (which originated with Dickson J. in C. U.PE. and was labelled
and formalized by Beetz J. in Bibeault69) was used for the purpose of
performing this classification. Identification of the appropriate standard
of review then followed automatically, with jurisdictional issues evaluated
in accordance with a standard of correctness, and the standard of patent
unreasonableness applied to issues falling within jurisdiction. Pushpanathan
appears, however, to have reversed this analysis; rather than certain issues
having some inherent characteristic (described as "jurisdictional"), that
could be discovered through a pragmatic and functional analysis,
Pushpanathan would seem to indicate that "jurisdictional" is now simply
a label that can be attached if the pragmatic and functional analysis indi-
cates that the administrative decision maker must be correct on this issue.
Thus, Bastarache J. stated:
69. In Bibeault, supra note 8, the Supreme Court identified the issue before the Quebec Labour
Commissioner (the meaning of the word "alienation" in the Quebec Labour Code) as jurisdictional,
applied the correctness standard, and quashed the decision of the Labour Commissioner. In finding
that the interpretational issue was jurisdictional, Beetz J. followed C. UPE., supra note 8, in reject-
ing the preliminary or collateral questions doctrine, while at the same time, describing the idea
behind that doctrine-that administrative tribunals could not be allowed by a misinterpretation of a
statutory provision to assume a different power than that given them by the legislature-as "unim-
peachable." What was wrong, according to Beetz J., was not the idea of there being jurisdictional
limits and thus, of a category of jurisdictional questions that had to be answered (in the view of the
courts) correctly, but the methodology that was used to differentiate these questions from the intra-
jurisdictional variety. In his opinion, the remedy lay in abandoning the formalism of the preliminary
or collateral questions analysis and taking the same approach to the analysis of whether a question
was jurisdictional or not that Dickson J. had taken in C. UPE. to the question of whether an interpre-
tation of a question within jurisdiction was patently unreasonable. For each question challenged by
judicial review, this meant a "pragmatic and functional analysis" was to be carried out to determine
whether the legislature intended the question to fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative
decision-maker. The factors listed by Beetz J. for consideration were the wording and purpose of the
Act, the reason why the administrative decision-maker was created, the expertise of the decision-
maker, and the nature of the question being decided. Bibeault continues to be noteworthy for having
named the pragmatic and functional approach, as well as for providing the first outline of the ele-
ments of such an approach.
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Although the language and approach of the "preliminary", "collateral"
or "jurisdictional" question has been replaced by this pragmatic and func-
tional approach, the focus of the inquiry is still on the particular, indi-
vidual provision being invoked and interpreted by the tribunal. Some
provisions within the same Act may require greater curial deference than
others, depending on the factors which will be described in more detail
below. To this extent, it is still appropriate and helpful to speak of"juris-
dictional questions" which must be answered correctly by the tribunal in
order to be acting intra vires. But it should be understood that a question
which "goes to jurisdiction" is simply descriptive of a provision for which
the proper standard of review is correctness, based upon the outcome of
the pragmatic and functional analysis.7"
Thus, according to Bastarache J., the presence or absence of a priva-
tive clause in the empowering legislation is simply one of several factors
to be considered by the court in determining the appropriate level of defer-
ence. Depending on how these factors balance each other, the standard of
review for any given issue could fall anywhere from correctness, to rea-
sonableness simpliciter, to patent unreasonableness:
[T]he absence of a privative clause does not imply a high standard of
scrutiny, where other factors bespeak a low standard. However, the pres-
ence of a "full" privative clause is compelling evidence that the court
ought to show deference to the tribunal's decision, unless other factors
strongly indicate the contrary as regards the particular determination in
question.
71
Later decisions of the Supreme Court have followed this newer ap-
proach. For example, in two labour relations cases, both involving a priva-
tive clause, the Court used the pragmatic and functional analysis to move
immediately to the identification of the level of deference owed, rather
than to identifying issues as jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional.72 Both
70. Pushpanathan, supra note 6 at para. 28.
71. Ibid. at para. 30.
72. Ivanhoe v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 500, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 565, 201 D.L.R.
(4th) 577, 2001 SCC 47 [Ivanhoe]; Sept-Iles (City ol) v. Quebec (Labour Court), [2001] 2 S.C.R.
670, 201 D.L.R. (4th) 659, 2001 SCC 48 [Sept-Iles]. Interestingly, however, although Trinity West-
ern University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 1,
2001 SCC 31 [Trinity Westernl did not involve a privative clause (and therefore under the traditional
approach, there would be no need to classify issues as going to or falling within jurisdiction in order
to know what standard of review to apply) lacobucci and Bastarache JJ., writing for the majority, did
at one point use the language of jurisdiction, stating: "We are therefore of the view that the BCCT
had jurisdiction to condemn discriminatory practices in dealing with the TWU." (ibid. at para. 14)
However, the judgement then went on to apply the pragmatic and functional analysis in order to
establish the appropriate level of review as correctness.
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Sept-ies and Ivanhoe involved decisions of the Quebec Labour Court which
turned on the interpretation given to a section of the Quebec Labour Code
7 3
dealing with successor rights. In each case, the Labour Court's
decision was challenged as not conforming with the interpretation of that
section given by the Supreme Court in Bibeault. Although the Quebec
Labour Code contains a full privative clause, the Supreme Court did not
revert to the pre-Pushpanathan approach of asking itself if the question of
whether a business had been alienated was an issue that went to, or fell
within, the Labour Court's jurisdiction. Instead, the Court used the prag-
matic and functional analysis, as set out in Pushpanathan, to move
directly to identifying the appropriate level of deference. In Bibeault, the
question of whether alienation had occurred had been judged to be a juris-
dictional issue and therefore subject to the standard of correctness, yet in
Sept-iles and Ivanhoe, the Court applied the standard of patent unreason-
ableness. Two reasons for the shift in standard of review were highlighted
by Arbour J. First, the Labour Court had, since the decision in Bibeault,
developed its own expertise in interpreting the relevant section. Secondly
(and even more significantly), the Labour Code had been amended since
Bibeault to state that the Labour Court was to determine whether an alien-
ation had in fact taken place.74
There was significant unevenness in the response of the lower courts
to these aspects of Pushpanathan. Certainly a shift in approach with re-
gard to privative clauses was evident in some of the lower court decisions
that we examined. Some judges seem to have departed markedly from the
pre-Pushpanathan focus on identifying questions of law as either going to
or falling within jurisdiction. Thus in Mitchell v. British Columbia (Direc-
tor of Employment Standards),7 5 there was no mention of whether an issue
before the Employment Standards Board was jurisdictional. The Court
simply discussed each of the four factors referred to in Pushpanathan,
including the existence of a full privative clause, and concluded that the
standard of patent unreasonableness was applicable. Similarly, in Skyline
73. R.S.Q. c. C-27.
74. More recently, in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R.
84, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 107, 2002 SCC 3 [Chieu], the Supreme Court considered the jurisdictional
quality of the question at issue as one of the factors within the pragmatic and functional analysis that
supported the application of the correctness standard. This suggests that a different standard of
review might have been applicable if other factors had more strongly supported the application of
one of the other and more deferential standards. This implication appears to modify the symmetrical
relationship between jurisdictional quality and review for correctness that Pushpanathan
contemplated.
75. (1998), 62 B.C.L.R. (3d) 79 (S.C.) [Mitchell]. The issue before the Board was whether certain
employees were entitled to statutory group termination pay.
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Roofing Ltd. v. Alberta (Workers'Compensation Board),7 6 an application
for judicial review of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Tribunal, the Court discussed the four Pushpanathan factors, including
the presence of a full privative clause, without any consideration of whether
the question (was the applicant actually an employee) should be character-
ized as jurisdictional.
On occasion, courts referred expressly to this change in approach. For
instance, in Aseniwuche Winewak Nation v. Greenview (Municipal Dis-
trict No. 16),"7 which involved judicial review of a decision of the Munici-
pal Government Board as to the accessability of certain lands, the Court
stated that in Pezim, Southam and Pushpanathan the Supreme Court had,
"shifted the focus from determining whether or not a question is jurisdic-
tional to ascertaining the standard of review on a spectrum by examining a
series of factors."78 In Golden Valley Golf Course Ltd. v. British Columbia
(Minister of Transportation and Highways), 9 a case involving an appeal
from a decision of the Expropriation Compensation Board, the Court made
clear its understanding of Bastarache J.'s use of the term "jurisdictional".
After concluding that the correctness standard applied to an issue of law
that was not within the Board's area of expertise, the court then stated,
"...this means that if the Board was incorrect in its ruling, the error was a
'jurisdictional' one. '80 Interestingly, in several cases, it seemed that coun-
sel were still using the pre-Pushpanathan analysis, while the court was
ready to move to the newer approach. In Michailides v. Alberta (Workers'
Compensation Board),81 a case involving judicial review of a decision of
the Workers' Compensation Board, the applicant argued that the issue
before the Board was a matter going to its jurisdiction. The Court responded
by quoting Pushpanathan regarding the meaning of jurisdictional error,
and then stating, "[t]he starting point is therefore the pragmatic functional
76. [2001] 10 WWR. 651, 95 Alta. L.R. (3d) 126, 2001 ABQB 624 [Skyline Roofing]. See also Brown
v. Alberta DentalAssn., [2002] 5 WWR. 221, 299 A.R. 60, 2002 ABCA 24. In Cabre Exploration Ltd. v
Alberta (Environment Appeal Board) (2001), 290 A.R. 146, 33 Admin. L.R. (3d) 140, 2001 ABQB 293,
the Court used the Pushpanathan analysis; however, a slight hold-over from the previous approach may
be reflected in the court's comment that the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board has usually been treated
with deference so long as it acted within its jurisdiction (ibid. at para. 13).
77. [200113 W.W.R. 693, 89 Alta. L.R. (3d) 27, 2000 ABQB 839 [Aseniwuche].
78. Ibid. at para. 17.
79. (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 248, 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 287, 2001 BCCA 392.
80. Ibid. at para. 22.
81. (1999), 260 A.R. 323, 1999 ABQB 941, aff'd (2003) 320 A.R. 313,2003 ABCA 49 [Michailides].
The issue before the Board was whether Canada Pension Plan entitlements should be deducted from
Earning Loss Supplements.
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analysis, not the categorization of the error."82 In Canadian Health Care
Guild (Alberta Union of Provincial Employees) v. Glenrose Rehabilitation
Hospital,83 the parties again used the language of jurisdictional issues in
arguing the standard of review to be applied to a decision of an arbitrator
under a collective agreement; however, the Court referred to Pushpanathan
and stated:
The question before me then is not whether the Board made any juris-
dictional errors but what is the applicable standard of review in relation
to the matters addressed by the Board.84
Similarly, in Alberta Union of Provincial Employees, Local 58/001 V.
Alberta (Mental Health Board),85 the union argued that the Board had made
a jurisdictional error. The Court noted that this was no longer the appro-
priate approach.86
In contrast, in a number of cases, the court appeared unsure whether to
use the four Pushpanathan factors to move directly to the standard of
review or whether the presence of a privative clause still required some
classification of issues as jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. Somejudges
have apparently combined elements of the pre- and post-Pushpanathan
analysis, generally without discussing how the two approaches might fit
together. For instance, in Pyramid Electric Corp.v. International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local 52987 an employer sought to quash an
order of the Saskatchewan Labour Board, which had required the employer
to produce certain documents in the context of an unfair labour practice
complaint. The complaint turned on whether or not Pyramid was a
successor to another company, within the meaning of s. 37(1) of the
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act.8 8 The Act included a privative clause pro-
tecting orders and decisions of the Board. On judicial review, the Court
quoted Bastarache J.'s comments on jurisdictional issues, as well as por-
tions from the judgment outlining each of the four factors to be considered
82. Ibid. at para. 11.
83. (2001), 282 A.R. 258, 2001 ABQB 2 [Glenrose].
84. Ibid. at para. 13.
85. (2001), 308 A.R. 114, 2001 ABQB 938, aff'd (2003), 320 A.R. 267, 2003 ABCA 16, 120011 A.J.
No. 1405 [Alberta Union of Provincial Employees]. This case involved judicial review of a decision
of a board of arbitration in a grievance involving layoffs.
86. Ibid. at para. 6.
87. (1999), 185 Sask. R. 82, 19 Admin. L.R. (3d) 113, 1999 SKQB 114, aff'd (2000), 199 Sask. R.
1, 2000 SKCA 44 [Pyramid].
88. R.S.S. 1978 c. T-17, s. 37(1), as am. by S.S. 1994, c. 47, s. 19.
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in the pragmatic and functional analysis. In applying these factors, the
Court held that the nature of the question was "decisive to the applicable
standard of review." 9 It then stated that issues relating to the production
and disclosure of documents were not "central to its [the Board's] field of
expertise."9 While this sounds very like the "new" approach, before there
was any reference to Pushpanathan, the Court also spoke of, "[n]arrow
errors ofjurisdiction [which] relate generally to a provision which confers
jurisdiction."91 Immediately after discussing the relationship between the
Board's expertise and the question before it, the Court stated:
As the determination of this question is not within the Board's jurisdic-
tion "stricto sensu," the standard of review applicable here is whether
the interpretation is correct.
92
A similar merging of approaches was found in a number of other cases.
For instance, in Maliseet Nation At Tobique v. Bear,93 the Federal Court
Trial Division held that review for patent unreasonableness applied to a
finding of wrongful dismissal by an adjudicator appointed under the Canada
Labour Code.94 The Court referred to Pushpanathan, then began the analy-
sis of the standard of review by stating that "the Adjudicator acted within
the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the ... Code." 95
Another such example is Simons v. Prince Edward Island (Workers'
Compensation Board), 96 a case involving judicial review of a decision of
the Executive Director of the Prince Edward Island Workers' Compensa-
tion Board to send the applicants' medical files to a doctor, without their
consent or knowledge. The Prince Edward Island Supreme Court referred
to the existence of a full privative clause in the Workers Compensation
Act97 as one of the factors to be considered in the Pushpanathan analysis;
however, such an analysis was not undertaken. Instead, appearing to
revert to an approach based on identifying issues as jurisdictional or non-
jurisdictional, the Court stated that Pushpanathan
89. Pyramid, supra note 87 at para. 23.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid. at para. 14.
92. Ibid. at para. 23.
93. (1999), 178 F.T.R. 121 (T.D.) [Maliseet Nation].
94. R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2.
95. Maliseet Nation, supra note 93 at para. 22.
96. (1999), 186 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 277, 18 Admin. L.R. (3d) 277 (PE.I. S.C. (T.D.)), rev'd (2000), 188
Nfld. & PEIR. 138, 2000 PESCAD 15 [Simons].
97. R.S.P.E.I. 1988, C. W-7.1.
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... does not appear to detract from Sopinka J.'s analysis in
Pasiechnyk... This appears to be the traditional position that a
correctness standard will apply if there is an act in excess of a tribunal's
jurisdiction.98
In Canada (A.G.) v. Marinos,99 the challenge was to an adjudicator's
holding that she had jurisdiction to hear a grievance under the Public Ser-
vice Staff Relations Act. 0° The adjudicator's decision was based on her
interpretation of the Act's definition of "employee." On judicial review,
the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that a correctness standard was
appropriate. Although the decision contained a reference to Pushpanathan,
the pragmatic and functional analysis seemed to have been used chiefly
for the more traditional task of distinguishing questions that go to jurisdic-
tion from those that fall within it. Thus, the Federal Court of Appeal stated:
Considering the pragmatic and functional approach, the issue before us
is whether section 2 of the PSSRA [Public Service Staff Relations Act]
involves a jurisdictional question, and if so, what is the proper test to be
applied.101
The Court went on to quote Bibeault to the effect that a "mere error" in
interpreting a section which limits a tribunal's powers will lead to a loss of
jurisdiction; 10 2 however, this was followed by the quotation from
Pushpanathan regarding the meaning of "jurisdictional." Northwood v.
British Columbia (Forest Practices Board)103 involved the judicial review
of a decision of the Forest Practices Board of British Columbia to include
certain matters in one of its Compliance Reports. The Court referred to
Pezim and Southam and listed the four factors from Pushpanathan, but
then suggested that the identification of an issue as jurisdictional com-
pelled the use of the correctness standard (rather than the other way around,
as Pushpanathan suggested):
Where a question is truly jurisdictional as it must be where there is a
rigourous privative clause.. .then a "reasonableness" standard may not
98. Simons, supra note 96 at para. 77.
99. [2000] 4 EC. 98,186 D.L.R. (4th) 517, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 221
[Marinos].
100. R.S.C. 1985, c. P-35.
101. Marinos, supra note 99 at para. 12.
102. Ibid. at para. 15.
103. (2001), 86 B.C.L.R. (3d) 215, 31 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2001 BCCA 141, leave to appeal to S.CC.
refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 207 [Northwood].
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meet the test of want of jurisdiction. I understand that a "correctness"
standard is required in interpreting the constating statute of the tribunal
and other general public statutes, and that a "not patently unreasonable"
standard is required for other issues before the tribunal." °
104. Ibid. at para. 35. For a similar approach, see New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Canadian
Union of Public Employees, Local 1190 (2000), 226 N.B.R. (2d) 357 (Q.B. (T.D.)), aff'd (2001), 198
D.L.R. (4th) 66,236 N.B.R. (2d) 87,2001 NBCA 21, where the Court fairly quickly concluded that of the
three issues dealt with in a decision of an adjudicator under a collective agreement, two should be held to
the standard of patent unreasonableness, and one to a correctness standard. The Court listed, but did not
discuss, the four factors from Pushpanathan, supra note 6, and included a lengthy quote from Pushpanathan
regarding the spectrum of review and the concept of jurisdictional questions. However, this quote was
prefaced by a statement that appeared to reverse Bastarache J's comments: "In Pushpanathan ... Bastarache
J. concludes that a jurisdictional error is to be assessed on the basis of correctness." (ibid. at para. 17) In
Glenrose, supra note 83, which involved the review of a decision of an arbitration board, the Court
started with the Pushpanathan approach, stating, "[t]he question before me then is not whether the Board
made any jurisdictional errors, but what is the applicable standard of review in relation to the matters
addressed by the Board" (ibid. at para. 13). However, the Court seemed uncertain as to whether this was
to be the approach in all cases, for it also stated that it was the absence of a full privative clause that
required an evaluation of the other three factors from Pushpanathan (ibid. at para. 15) and concluded that
the issue in question was "deep within the Board's jurisdiction" (ibid at para. 32). InAtlas Industries Ltd.
v. Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board) (1999), 175 Sask. R. 251, 17 Admin. L.R. (3d) 211 (Q.B.),
rev'd (1999), 177 Sask. R. 307, 17 Admin. L.R. (3d) 234 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [ 1999]
S.C.C.A. No. 346 [Atlas Industries], the Court began its discussion of standard of review by reference to
jurisdictional questions and quoted from Bibeault with regard to distinguishing jurisdictional from non-
jurisdictional questions. The Court then refered to Pushpanathan as taking "a somewhat different ap-
proach to the standard of judicial review that appears to be less deferential than has previously been the
case." (ibid. at para. 13) This was followed by several lengthy quotes from Pushpanathan, including the
passage regarding the meaning of "jurisdictional," yet in the next paragraph the Court spoke of the diffi-
culty of "determining whether a specific question is one within jurisdiction or one that confers jurisdic-
tion." (ibid. at para. 17) Other cases which still seem to classify issues as jurisdictional or non-jurisdic-
tional include: Greater Vancouver Mental Health Service Society v. British Columbia (Information and
Privacy Commissioner), [1999] B.C.. No. 199 (B.C.S.C) [Greater Vancouverl; Alberta (Environment) v.
McCain Foods (Canada) Ltd. (2000), 263 A.R. 55, 21 Admin. L.R. (3d) 141 (Q.B.) [McCain Foods];
PCL Constructors Pacific v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 115 (2000), 77 B.C.L.R.
(3d) 270, 2000 BCSC 968 [PCL Constructors]; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of
Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Broadcasters (1999), 239 N.R. 119, 1 C.P.R. (4th) 80 (EC.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 250 [Society of Composers]; Canada Safeway Ltd. v. United
Food and Commercial Workers, Locals 312A, 373A and 401 (2001), 283 A.R. 32, 2001 ABQB 120;
Construction andAIlied Union (CLAC), Local 154 v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board Construction
Industry Panel) (2002), 200 N.S.R. (2d) 88, 2002 NSSC 2, aff'd (2002), 207 N.S.R. (2d) 1, 2002 NSCA
73; LeisurelandSports Bar v. Edmonton (City) (2001), 298 A.R. 201, 37Admin L.R. (3d) 73, 2001 ABQB
745; Ontario (A.G.) v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union (2000), 52 OR. (3d) 77, 195 D.L.R.
(4th) 376 (C.A.); Air Nunavut v. Canada (Minister of Transportation) (2000), [2001] 1 EC. 138, 187
ET.R. 16 (T.D.); Assiniboine South Teachers Assn. of the Manitoba Teachers'Society v. Assiniboine
South School Division No.3 (2000), 187 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 148 Man. R. (2d) 1, 2000 MBCA 9, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 435; Seimans Westinghouse v. Canada (Minister of Public
Works and Government Services) (2001), [2002] 1 EC. 292, 202 D.L.R. (4th) 610,2001 FCA 241, leave
to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 490. At times, a court's use of the pre-Pushpanathan
terminology may, at least in part, be predicated on language in a statute. See e.g. Queen Elizabeth H
Health Sciences Centre v. Nova Scotia (Workers'Compensation Appeals Tribunal) (2001), 200 D.L.R.
(4th) 504, 193 N.S.R. (2d) 385, 2001 NSCA 75, considering the Nova Scotia Workers'Compensation Act,
S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, which allows appeals on any question regarding the jurisdiction of the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Tribunal, as well as on questions of law.
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Clearly then, the courts have not completely abandoned the pre-
Pushpanathan approach, where the presence of a privative clause required
that errors of law be classified as either going to or falling within jurisdic-
tion, in order to determine the standard of review. Given the degree to
which the previous approach was entrenched in administrative law, it is
perhaps not surprising to discover that the shift set out in Pushpanathan
has not yet been fully incorporated into the jurisprudence at the lower court
levels. On the other hand, some lower courts clearly have accepted and
started to apply the newer approach, and with results that are consistent
with the logical implications of Pushpanathan, namely that a privative
clause no longer dictates a choice between correctness and patent
unreasonableness review. A few of the lower court decisions that we ex-
amined did use the middle standard (resonableness simpliciter) in the con-
text of a privative or finality clause. Thus, in Maple Leaf Foods v.
Alejandro,"°5 where a full privative clause was involved, a decision of the
referee regarding entitlement to termination pay under the Employment
Standards Act"°6 was held to the reasonableness standard. Various factors
were taken as indicating the appropriateness ofjudicial deference and oth-
ers as indicating a contrary tendency, so the court chose the mid point on
the spectrum of review. In Legal Oil and Gas Ltd. v. Alberta (Minister of
Environment), ' 7 the Court applied a reasonableness standard to a decision
of the Minister of the Environment on an issue involving mixed fact and
law, where the Minister's decision was protected by a privative clause. In
Newfoundland (Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission)
v. Smith,"°8 the Court did not specifically state the standard of review to be
applied to a decision of a Review Commissioner under the Workplace
Health, Safety and Compensation Act. 109 After noting the existence of a
privative clause, however, the Court went on to state that the Review
Commissioner's findings on the issue of whether a worker had suffered
work-related stress were "eminently reasonable in light of the recorded
facts".I 0 Such wording probably indicates that a reasonableness standard
was applied.
105.(1999), 120 O.A.C. 264, 17 Admin L.R. (3d) I (C.A.) [Maple Leaf Foods].
106. R.S.O. 1990, c. E.14, as rep. by S.O. 2000, c. 41, s. 144(1).
107. (2000), 265 A.R. 341, 34 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 303, 2000 ABQB 388 [Legal Oil and Gas Ltd.]. The
Minister had confirmed an environmental protection order issued by the Director of the Land Rec-
lamation Division.
108. (2000), 194 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 159 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D)). The Review Commissioner had held that
the applicant suffered from work-related stress.
109. R.S.N. 1990, c. W- 11, s. 2(o); ibid., ss. 26(1)-(2), as am. by S.N. 1994, c. 12, s. 4.
110. Supra note 108 at para. 24.
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Occasionally in the context of a privative clause, the court hovered
between the two deferential standards. This was so in Eggertson,1" a case
which involved judicial review of a decision of the Professional Appeal
Committee of the Alberta Teachers Association, upholding the finding of a
hearing committee that a teacher had been guilty of professional miscon-
duct. The Court suggested that the factual quality of the issues, the pres-
ence of a privative clause, the expertise of the Committee and the purpose
of the Act, "weigh heavily towards a patently unreasonable standard."
' 12
The Court went on to say, "[a]t the very least, they weigh towards a
reasonableness standard."" 3 Two other cases, Duffy v. Alberta (Human
Rights and Citizenship Commission)"4 and Alberta (Minister of Municipal
Affairs) v. Alberta (Municipal Government Board),"5 applied a test of
reasonableness simpliciter to administrative decision-makers protected by
finality clauses.
In the vast majority of the cases we reviewed that dealt with a privative
or a finality clause, however, courts applied either the standard of correct-
ness or that of patent unreasonableness. Whether a court perceived this as
simply the way in which the various elements of the pragmatic functional
analysis stacked up in a particular case, 1 6 or whether this was considered
inevitable given the existence of a privative clause, depended, not surpris-
ingly, on the extent to which the court had adopted the Pushpanathan ap-
proach to the concept ofjurisdiction. Conforming to the pre-Pushpanathan
approach left no room for a middle standard. For instance, the Court in
Northwood stated, "I understand that a 'correctness' standard is required
in interpreting the constating statute of the tribunal and other general pub-
lic statutes, and that a 'not patently unreasonable' standard is required for
other issues before the tribunal."" Similarly, in Simons, the Court quoted
from Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers'Compensation Board) to the
effect that where there is a full privative clause, a court can review only for
an error of jurisdiction or for patent unreasonableness within jurisdiction.
111. Supra note 19.
112.Ibid. at para. 19.
113. Ibid. In McTague v. Canada (AG.) (1999), [2000] 1 F.C. 647, 177 F.T.R. 5 (T.D.) the court
determined that reasonableness was the appropriate standard against which to review a decision of
the Veterans Review and Appeals Board. This is perhaps an example which blurs a number of
boundaries. The decision of the Board was protected by a finality clause and the fact that the legisla-
tion did not contain a full privative clause was one of the elements that persuaded the court to apply
reasonableness rather than patent unreasonableness.
114. (2001), 301 A.R. 236, 36 Admin. L.R. (3d) 312, 2001 ABQB 541 [Duffy].
115. (2000), 272 A.R. 34 (Q.B.).
116. For instance, in Legal Oil and Gas Ltd., supra
note 107, the court refered to all three standards of review before choosing patent unreasonableness.
117. Supra note 103 at para. 35.
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In other cases, 18 courts either spoke explicitly of the applicability of the
full spectrum of standards of review to judicial review involving a priva-
tive clause, or implied such applicability by using the Pushpanathan ap-
proach to determine the standard of review. Yet, as noted above, even in
these cases it was rare indeed for the court actually to apply the middle
standard.
Another corollary of treating privative clauses as simply one factor to
be considered in the pragmatic and functional analysis is that it opens the
door (at least in theory) to using the patently unreasonable standard where
there is no privative clause. This was the approach taken in A VS Technolo-
gies,"19 a case involving judicial review of a decision of the Copyright
Board; in Lethbridge (City) v. Daisley,120 a case where the issuance of a
building permit was being challenged; and in Apotex,"' a case where the
decision under review involved the conditions to be attached to the manu-
facture of a drug before its inclusion on the Drug Benefits List.
22
In Teeluck v. Canada (Treasury Board)23 also, the patently unreason-
able standard was applied to an administrative decision-maker not pro-
tected by a privative clause. What makes this case particularly interesting
is that the enabling legislation had initially contained a privative clause,
which had been repealed before the commencement of the judicial review
proceedings. Yet, according to the court, this did "not mean that decisions
of the Public Service Staff Relations Board are now more readily set
aside.' 24 Bastarache J.'s statement in Pushpanathan that "the absence of
a privative clause does not imply a high standard of scrutiny, where other
factors bespeak a low standard"'' 25 was not cited in Teeluk as authority for
the continued application of the patently unreasonable standard.
118. See e.g. Halifax Longshoremen s Assn., Local 269 v. Offshore Logistics (2000), 257 N.R. 338,
25 Admin. L.R. 224 (F.C.A.).
119. Supra note 22.
120. (2000), 250 A.R. 365, 83 Alta. L.R. (3d) 239, 2000 ABCA 79, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
[2000] S.C.C.A. No. 214, 293 A.R. 189 [Lethbridge].
121. Supra note 22.
122. See also Hayat v. University of Toronto (1999), 181 D.L.R. (4th) 496, 127 O.A.C. 69 (C.A.)
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 27. The patently unreasonable standard was
also applied on an appeal in Howe Sound Pulp and Paper Ltd. v. British Columbia (Environmental
Appeal Board) (1999), 29 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 225 (B.C.S.C.), although the court also stated that even if
the appropriate standard of review had been reasonableness, the decision would still stand.
123. (1999), 177 ET.R. 39 (T.D.), aff'd (2000), 262 N.R. 389 [F.C.A.].
124. Ibid. at para. 19.
125. Supra note 6 at para. 30.
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In C.B. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services),126 the
Court did not identify a standard of review but, in overturning a decision
of the Director of Child and Family Services, stated that the decision was
patently unreasonable. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Mitromdia
CMR Montr~al,127 the Court stated that a decision of the CRTC must be
shown "a great deal of deference," 2' despite the absence of a privative
clause, given the Commission's expertise and the delicate balancing
required among "conflicting objectives ... which essentially [involve] eco-
nomic and cultural policy considerations.' 29 Similarly, in Money s Mush-
rooms Ltd. v. British Columbia (Marketing Board),30 a decision of the
British Columbia Marketing Board was given "considerable deference.'
3'
On the other hand, the older approach was expressly followed in several
cases, including City Furniture (YT) Ltd. v. Yukon Liquor Corp., ' 2 where
the Court held that the patently unreasonable standard should not apply to
a decision of the Liquor Licensing Board, as "there is no privative clause
ousting the jurisdiction of the court."'33
c. Relationship Between Expertise and Other Elements of the Pragmatic
and Functional Analysis
In Pushpanathan, Bastarache J. explored the relationship between exper-
tise and the other three elements of the pragmatic and functional analysis.
The focus on expertise is not new. As far back as C. UPE., the relative
expertise of an administrative decision maker, as opposed to that of the
courts, was recognized as calling for deference.3 4 In Bibeault, Beetz J.
identified the expertise of the decision maker as one of the four elements
126. (2000), 154 Man. R. (2d) 63, 40 C.R. (5th) 308, 2000 MBQB 215 [C.B. v. Manitoba].
127. (1999), 254 N.R. 266 (F.C.A.).
128.Ibid. at para. 3.
129. Ibid. at paras. 5-6.
130. [1999] B.C.J. No. 2902 (SC.), aff'd 2001 BCCA 453.
131.Ibid. at para. 32. In this case, the Board upheld a decision of the Mushroom Marketing Board
which required changes in a proposed contract between mushroom growers and a licensed market-
ing agency, where the Mushroom Board was of the view that clauses within the contract "conflict[ed]
with its regulatory authority." (ibid. at para. 1)
132. (2000), 26 Admin. L.R. (3d) 286, 2000 YTSC 517 [City Furniture]. This case involved a refusal
to renew three liquor licences.
133. Ibid. at para. 12.
134. The Supreme Court of Canada accepted in C. UPE., supra note 8, that the Labour Board was a
specialized tribunal that could apply "its understanding of the body of jurisprudence that has devel-
oped around the collective bargaining system, as understood in Canada, and its labour relations
sense acquired from accumulated experience in the area." (supra note 8 at para. 12)
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of the pragmatic and functional analysis. In Southam, Iacobucci J.
described expertise as "the most important of the factors that a court must
consider in settling on a standard of review."' 35 In Pushpanathan, Bastarache
J. clarified the relationship between the expertise of the administrative
decision-maker and the other elements of the analysis by identifying three
aspects of evaluating expertise:
... the court must characterize the expertise of the tribunal in question; it
must consider its own expertise relative to that of the tribunal; and it
must identify the nature of the specific issue before the administrative
decision-maker relative to this expertise.'36
Thus, Pushpanathan emphasized that the level of an administrative
decision maker's expertise could only be judged in relation to the particu-
lar issue, not ascribed in general terms; courts are required to consider the
expertise of the administrative decision maker vis-A-vis the expertise
of the courts in the specific context of the question before the board or
tribunal.'
The Supreme Court decisions since Pushpanathan have continued to
emphasize the links between expertise and other elements of the analysis,
and the issue of expertise has been determinative in several recent cases
decided by the Court. In Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue-
MN.R.) v. Mattel Canada,3 ' the Court applied the correctness standard to
a question of law decided by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
The questions to be decided (what constituted a sale of goods, and how
two provisions of the Act related to each other) were not seen as calling
upon any scientific or technical experience that the Tribunal might have
accumulated. Instead, these issues were "traditionally the province of the
Courts."' 13 9 In Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority
Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities Commission),'4° a case which involved
an appeal from a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission as to
whether to use its powers to act in the public interest to grant a remedy to
aggrieved minority shareholders, the Court characterized this issue as fit-
135. Supra note 8 at para. 50.
136. Supra note 6 at para. 33.
137. Mullan reads Pushpanathan as indicating,
... that the Court is being much more careful in its willingness to concede expertise auto-
matically to tribunals. It is taking considerable care to calibrate any claims for respect to
expertise to the precise decision-making context.
(Mullan, supra note I at p. 79)
138. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 598, 2001 SCC 36 [Mattel].
139. Ibid. at para 33.
140. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2001 SCC 37 [Asbestos].
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ting within the Commission's "core of expertise."'' 41 Although deference
was considered warranted, the Court held that the existence of a right of
appeal indicated that reasonableness simpliciter, rather than the standard
of patent unreasonableness, was appropriate.
The Court's evaluation of expertise was also of critical importance in
Trinity Western, 42 a case which dealt with the judicial review of a decision
of the British Columbia College of Teachers. The College rejected an
application for accreditation from the University because of the College's
perception that certain practices of the University (in particular the "Com-
munity Standards" document denouncing homosexuality that Trinity
required every student to sign) were discriminatory. The trial judge of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia found that rejecting Trinity's applica-
tion for accreditation on these grounds fell outside the College's jurisdic-
tion. This determination was upheld by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal. The majority of the Supreme Court143 held that the absence of a
privative clause, the nature of the question (which was characterized as
involving human rights issues rather than educational issues) and the
relative expertise of the College and the courts on such matters, all indi-
cated that the correctness standard should be applied. In particular, the
majority was of the view that the College of Teachers did not possess ex-
pertise regarding human rights principles or the balancing of conflicting
rights. These three decisions conform to both Southam 's emphasis on ex-
pertise, and Pushpanathan 's clarification that expertise must be judged in
the context of a particular decision.
The Pushpanathan approach to expertise seemed to be understood and
applied in most of the lower court decisions we reviewed.'" Thus, in Pyra-
141. Ibid. at para. 49.
142. Supra note 72.
143. See ibid. L'Heureux-Dub dissented, arguing that even though there was no privative clause,
the other elements of the Pushpanathan approach favoured deference so strongly that the standard of
patent unreasonableness should be applied.
144. This was not universal however. One decision, Alberta v. Alberta (Labour Relations Board),
(2001) 293 A.R. 251, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 694, 2001 ABCA 299, seemed to de-emphasize the signifi-
cance of expertise. The Board had been required to decide whether municipal districts were employ-
ers within the meaning of the Improvement Districts Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. I-1, in the context of a
successor rights application. Although the determination of the meaning of "employee" might seem
to be the kind of issue that a Labour Board would face fairly frequently, the Alberta Court of Appeal
characterized this as a question of law and stated that the Board had no specialized expertise in
statutory interpretation. However, the existence of a privative clause and the purpose of the Act in
providing a "fair and speedy method of regulating labour issues" (ibid. at para. 59) convinced the
court that the legislature intended the decision to lie with the Board. Therefore, a standard of patent
unreasonableness was applied.
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mid,145 a case involving judicial review of a decision of the Saskatchewan
Labour Board to order an employer to disclose certain documents, the prin-
cipal reason identified by the Court for applying a correctness standard
was the board's lack of expertise relative to the issue before it. This was
also the case in Bradasch v. Yukon (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 146 where
the decision of a Review Officer under the Motor Vehicles Act"47 to uphold
the suspension of a driver's licence was challenged on the grounds that the
Review Officer had applied the wrong standard of proof. In Coughlan v.
WMC International,148 an appeal from a decision of the Ontario Securities
Commission, the Court also emphasized the need to evaluate expertise in
terms of the specific question before the administrative decision-maker.
The court recognized that "[t]he OSC [Ontario Securities Commission] is
a highly specialized tribunal with expertise in the regulation of capital
markets"'149 and referred to Pezim, where the Supreme Court held that some
deference was due to a decision of the British Columbia Securities Com-
mission. In Coughlan, however, the Court concluded that the Commis-
sion had been deciding "questions of law of general application [which]
are not squarely within [its] area of expertise."' 50 Therefore in Coughlan,
the Securities Commission was required to be correct in its determina-
tions.
In other cases, the expertise of the administrative decision-maker on
the issue before it was seen as mandating deference from the courts. For
instance, in North Central Health District, a decision of the Labour Rela-
tions Board to impose a collective agreement was seen as falling "squarely
within the parameters of the Act and ...best dealt with by a tribunal with a
particular expertise,"'' and as a result, the patently unreasonable standard
was applied. In Maple Leaf Foods,52 the Court reviewed a decision of a
referee under the Employment Standards Act'53 against a reasonableness
standard, stating that while referees were not part of a permanent tribunal,
they did acquire familiarity with the Act. While the issue in question -
the interpretation of "termination" - was held to be a question of law, it
was found to be one which would engage the referee's specialization. There-
145. Supra note 87.
146. Supra note 19.
147. R.S.Y. 1986, c. 118, as am. by S.Y. 1997, c. 14.
148.(2000), 143 O.A.C. 244, 31 Admin. L.R. (3d) 19 (Div. Ct.).
149. Ibid. at para. 27.
150. Ibid. at para. 34. The issue before the Commission was whether or not it was bound by a re-
scinded policy on non-disclosure, or by an undertaking given by the Commission's legal counsel.
151.Supra note 59 at para 30.
152. Supra note 105.
153. Supra note 106.
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fore, even in the context of an ad hoc decision-maker considering a ques-
tion of law, the Court was willing to recognize and defer to some degree of
expertise.
Further, in their evaluation of the expertise of administrative decision
makers, all but one of the cases we reviewed followed the approach of
previous jurisprudence in avoiding scrutiny of the backgrounds or skills of
the individual members of the board or tribunal, and focussed instead on
factors such as whether the Act required particular expertise or credentials
for appointment, whether the administrative decision maker presided as a
continuing body or was appointed on an ad hoc basis, and whether the
administrative decision maker was involved in a broad range of special-
ized activities, including policy development. For instance, in Bradasch,
the Court noted that the particular review officer making the decision had
legal training but held that since most review officers would not have such
expertise on questions of law, the correctness standard applied. The only
deviation from the usual approach was found in Association of the Aca-
demic Staff of the University ofAlberta v. Governors of the University of
Alberta,154 where the Court did see the expertise of the particular arbitrator
as offsetting the ad hoc nature of the appointment, in evaluating the level
of deference required:
It does appear that there is some support in the jurisprudence for a dis-
tinction between standing expert tribunals and ad hoc arbitrators for the
purposes of this element of the analysis. However, bearing in mind that
the parties were content to select the arbitrator, a former Chair of the
Alberta Labour Relations Board, and well known expert in the field, I
have difficulty perceiving the decision as stripped of expertise arising
from the qualities of the Arbitrator.'55
Two cases raised the interesting question of whether a Court should
ever defer to the expertise of the ordinary person. In Alberta (Family and
Social Services) v. Gramaglia,156 an Appeal Panel appointed under the As-
sured Income for the Severely HandicappedAct57 had to decide whether a
disability pension received from another country fit within the definition
of income within the Act, such that it should be deducted from the "handi-
154. (2001), 92 Alta. L.R. (3d) 45, 32 Admin. L.R (3d) 175, 2001 ABQB 255, rev'd (2002), 303
A.R. 363, [2002] 7 W.WR. 204, 2002 ABCA 99 [Assn. ofAcademic Stafi].
155. Ibid. at para. 64.
156. (1999), 172 D.L.R. (4th) 294, 15Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 1999ABCA 105, leave to appeal to S.CC.
refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 252 [Gramaglia].
157. R.S.A. 1980, c. A-48.
After the Revolution
cap benefit" paid to the applicant. In a very briefjudgement, two judges of
the Court of Appeal restored the decision of the Appeal Panel which had
been set aside by the lower court on an application for judicial review.
Noting that the Act contained a partial privative clause, and classifying the
issue before the Panel as involving mixed fact and law, Hunt J.A. held
(with McClung J.A. concurring):
It is also true that this is not an "expert" tribunal in the way that the
tribunals were in Southam and Pezim. Nevertheless, it seems to me that
the members have been appointed at least in part because they are from
the community. As such, they have a certain level of expertise (by virtue
of their daily lives) as regards the type of issues they are required to
decide. In other words, given the subject-matter of their jurisdiction, I
think that their decisions are owed some deference simply because, as
relatively ordinary citizens, they can be expected to bring their daily
experience and common sense to bear on the matters in dispute. It is
therefore arguable that they are better qualified to decide the sorts of
questions that arise than, for example, are judges. 58
The third judge held that little deference needed be shown, because no
particular expertise was required by the Act. The same judges took the
same position on the issue of expertise in Sexsmith v. Alberta (Director of
Family and Social Services),'59 handed down the same day as Gramalgia.
The approach of Hunt and McClung J.A. is interesting not only because it
indicates that non-specialization may sometimes represent the needed ex-
pertise, but also because the Court was willing to recognize the expertise
of non-specialists with regard to issues that could easily have been classi-
fied as exercises in statutory interpretation, and therefore well within the
expertise of the court.
d. Application ofPragmatic and Functional Analysis to Questions ofFact
Historically, various phrases have been used to describe the seriousness of
the error required to warrant judicial intervention. For instance, the party
challenging a factual determination was required to show that the error
was palpable and overriding, that material findings of fact were unsup-
ported by evidence sufficient in law, or that findings of fact were mani-
festly against the weight of the evidence. All such phrases obviously set a
158. Gramalgia, supra note 156 at para. 4.
159.(1999), 245 A.R. 240,19 Admin. L.R. (3d) 231 (Q.B.).
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high and restrictive barrier to judicial intervention. Notwithstanding the
considerable latitude that judges held in deciding what was "palpable and
overriding" or "material" or "manifestly against the weight of the evidence,"
the result was that courts tended to be quite deferential to administrative
fact finding, in appeals as well as judicial review proceedings. It was not
initially clear what if any relationship existed between the standard of
"patent unreasonableness" and the more familiar phrases used to articulate
the deferential standard of review for factual determinations. Then, in 1990,
in two cases involving decision makers protected by privative clauses, 160
the Supreme Court implicitly equated review for patent unreasonableness
with the "no evidence" standard of review from earlier cases. The Court
did not, however, attempt to define fully or otherwise to clarify the
relationship between patent unreasonableness review and review of the
facts under the more traditional labels. In particular, the Court did not specify
whether the use of the new standard for review of findings of fact was
limited to cases to be reviewed under a privative clause. The Pushpanathan
restatement of the elements of the pragmatic and functional analysis con-
firms that challenges on issues of fact fall under the rubric of that analysis.
It therefore confirms that the standard of review for a determination of fact
will be one of the generic standards of review from the Southam spectrum.
Whether a question is primarily an issue of fact, or law, or a mixture of fact
and law is considered within the pragmatic and functional analysis under
the heading of "nature of question," and therefore, in the Pushpanathan
approach is simply one of the elements to be weighed in identifying the
appropriate standard of review.
This aspect of Pushpanathan seems to have become widely accepted
by lower courts. Interestingly, this expansion of the pragmatic and func-
tional analysis to issues of fact has at times led to the application of a more
interventionist standard than would previously have prevailed. True, the
high level of deference traditionally shown to an administrative decision-
maker's findings of fact was found in several of the lower court decisions
reviewed here. For instance, in Daycon Mechanical Systems Ltd. v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Millwrights Union
Local 1021),161 the Court applied the standard of patent unreasonableness
to a question of fact decided by the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board.
Patent unreasonableness was also applied to factual findings in Safiner v.
160. Lester, supra note 8; National Corn Growers, supra note 8.
161. (1999), 185 Sask. R. 142, 1999 SKQB 90 [Daycon].
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Northwest Territories and Nunavut (Workers' Compensation Board),162
Thimer v. Alberta (Workers 'Compensation BoardAppeals Commission),'
63
Corbett Lake Country Inn Ltd. v. British Columbia (Land Reserve Com-
mission),"6 Brown v. Alberta Dental Association,
165 A.B.Z. v. Canada,166
and Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).67
In a significant number of cases, however, the application of the prag-
matic and functional analysis led to the application of a more intervention-
ist level of scrutiny than the older tests would have mandated. For in-
stance, in Mahmood, the Convention Refugee Determination Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board had rejected the applicant's refugee
claim because the panel did not believe his evidence regarding persecu-
tion, or alternatively, because the panel found that he had an internal flight
alternative. On judicial review, the Federal Court Trial Division noted that
Pushpanathan made it clear that the Immigration and Refugee Board was
held to a standard of correctness on questions of law, but had not set the
standard of review for fact or mixed fact and law. The Federal Court then
stated that in Southam,
...the Supreme Court of Canada held that questions of mixed law and
fact are to be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness simpliciter. I
would be of the opinion that the same standard should apply to the re-
view of factual findings.'68
Although the Panel's decision in Mahmood was upheld, with the Court
holding that the Panel's findings on credibility were reasonable and that
162. (2001), 32 Admin. L.R. (3d) 212, 2001 NWTSC 11 [Saftner]. The applicant challenged, by way
of judicial review, a decision of the Workers Compensation Appeals Tribunal which denied him an
increase in disability benefits and opportunities for further training.
163. (2000), 276 A.R. 236, 31 Admin. L.R. (3d) 281, 2000 ABQB 706 [Thimer]. This case involved
judicial review of a Workers Compensation Appeal Board's decision to deny a claim for compensa-
tion.
164.2000 BCSC 1286. This involved judicial review of a decision of the Land Reserve Commission
allowing the Ministry of Transportation and highways to widen a highway, using land in the Agricul-
tural Land reserve.
165. (2002), 299 A.R. 60, [2002] 5 W.WR. 221, 2002 ABCA 24. This involved judicial review of a
decision of the Alberta Dental Association Board, holding that an agreement between a dentist and a
corporation which provided management services violated the Dental Profession Regulation (Alta.
Reg. 328/84).
166. Supra note 22. This case involved judicial review of a decision of the Appeal Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board, which had denied the applicant's request to reopen an appeal of a
deportation order.
167.(1999), 173 FT.R. 280, 2 Imm. L.R. (3d) 191 (T.D.) [Singh]. In this case, the applicant chal-
lenged, by way of judicial review, a determination of the Convention Refugee Determination Divi-
sion that he was not a refugee.
168. Mahmood, supra note 38 at para. 13.
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inferences drawn from the evidence were correct, clearly the Court did not
feel obliged to be particularly deferential to the Panel's decision. The rea-
sonableness standard was also applied on questions of fact in Chow v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),169 another application
for judicial review of a decision that the applicant was not a convention
refugee. The Court sent the matter back for redetermination by the Con-
vention Refugee Determination Division, stating:
Although the Board is entrusted with the task of weighing the evidence
and assessing the Applicant's credibility and these findings are treated
deferentially, I am of the opinion that the Board was unreasonable in its
assessment of the Applicant's testimony.
170
On judicial review of a decision of a Human Rights Board of Inquiry,
the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court in Magill stated:
On questions of fact, involving the Board's assessment of the evidence
and findings of fact...the standard of review which I consider to be ap-
plicable in the present case is "reasonableness."''
The standard of reasonableness simpliciter was also applied to find-
ings of fact made by a discipline subcommittee of the Nova Scotia Barris-
ters' Society in Nova Scotia Barristers'Society v. Pavey.'72
Just as the application of the pragmatic and functional analysis appears
to allow for the possibility of diluting previous common law standards of
review on issues of fact, one reading of section 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal
CourtAct173 would also allow for greater intervention by courts. In Kerth v.
Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 74 in reviewing a
decision of the Pension Appeals Board, the Federal Court Trial Division
169. [2000] EC.J. No. 788 (T.D.) [Chow].
170. Ibid. at para. 7.
171. Supra note 19 at para. 9.
172. (2001), 198 N.S.R. (2d) 381, 2001 NSCA 165. The discipline subcommittee of the Nova Scotia
Barristers' Society made a finding that Mr. Pavey had engaged in professional misconduct; he chal-
lenged this finding as not supported by the evidence.
173. Section 18.1(4) of the Federal Court Act, supra note 18, states:
The Trial Division may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board,
commission or other tribunal...
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or
capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.
174. (1999), 173 F.T.R. 102 (T.D.) [Kerth]. The Pensions Appeals Board had held that Mr. Kerth was
employable, and therefore not eligible for a disability pension.
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interpreted 18.1 (4)(d) as permitting the use of any of the standards of re-
view in the spectrum:
I note that the phrases in paragraph 18.1 (4)(d) are disjunctive; one asks
whether the decision under review was based on a finding of fact that
was made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the
material before the decision-maker. That is, insofar as the review of the
decision by reference to their underlying facts is concerned, the statu-
tory mandate allows for a spectrum of review from one which involves a
high degree of deference (perversity or capriciousness must be shown)
to one in which correctness or reasonableness may be the test (the deci-
sion-maker did not exhibit regard for the material before it).
175
On the other hand, in Stadnyk v. Canada (Employment and Immigra-
tion Commission),17 6 a case involving judicial review of a decision of a
Review Tribunal established under the Canadian Human Rights Act, the
Federal Court of Appeal stated:
With respect to the review of findings of fact, in my view it is paragraph
18.1 of the Federal CourtAct which defines the standard of review exer-
cisable by the Federal Court. It is a relatively narrow basis of review
which only permits judicial intervention where this court concluded that
the findings of fact are wrong and that they were made in a perverse or
capricious manner or without regard to the material before the Tribunal.
As has been pointed out by Hugessen J. in Canadian Pasta Manufactur-
ers Association v. Aurora Importing and Distribution et al ... this is tan-
tamount to a "patently unreasonable" test espoused elsewhere as a stan-
dard of review in matters of fact.
177
In Lai v. Canada (A.G.)17 8 the Court also referred to the wording of the
Federal Court Act on matters of fact. Although the commentary was brief,
the Federal Court Trial Division here seemed to take the same approach as
in Stadnyk, stating that for a court to intervene on "a pure question of fact
... the determination must be found to be patently unreasonable ... or made
175.Ibid. at para. 19.
176. (2000), 257 N.R. 385 (F.C.A.) [Stadnyk]. This case involved an allegation of gender discrimina-
tion in the context of a job interview. Both the Human Rights Tribunal and the Review Tribunal
dismissed the complaint. This was challenged by way of judicial review.
177.Ibid. at para. 22.
178. (2001), 208 F.T.R. 67, 2001 FCT 740 [Lai]. In this case, the applicant challenged, by way of
judicial review, a decision of the Chair of the Public Service Commission Appeal Board, dismissing
an appeal regarding appointments made from a closed competition.
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in a perverse or capricious manner without regard to the material." '179 In
Stelco v. British Steel Canada,180 a case involving judicial review of a deci-
sion of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal regarding dumping, the
Court stated with regard to s. 18.1 (4)(d):
It does not seem to us to advance matters appreciably to try to determine
whether this equates to a "patently unreasonable" or an "unreasonable-
ness simpliciter" standard. Indeed, there is a danger that the inquiry of
that kind may serve to divert the Court's attention from a careful consid-
eration of the words in which Parliament has formulated the standard of
review for the factual findings in which federal administrative tribunals
base their decisions.
However, this is not to say that the words of paragraph 18.1(4)(d) are
self-applying. Far from it. It is certainly useful to approach the question
of giving more specific content to the statutory language by considering
the common law standard for reviewing findings of fact and the factors
that are included in a pragmatic or functional analysis."'
e. Application of Pragmatic and Functional Analysis to Discretion
Pushpanathan restated the pragmatic and functional analysis for the stan-
dard of review for questions of law and of fact under statutes with and
statutes without a privative clause. In Baker, that framework for analysis
was applied to the review of discretionary decision-making. That case
involved an application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister
of Immigration and Citizenship not to exercise the discretion provided
under section 114(2) of the Immigration Act to allow Baker, an overstayer,
to apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada. One significant
ground for her application was that she had four young, Canadian-born
children. The Supreme Court held that a failure to consider the interests of
Ms. Baker's children meant that the Minister's discretion had not been
exercised reasonably. L'Heureux-Dub6 J., writing for a unanimous court,
held that the pragmatic and functional analysis from Pushpanathan could
also be applied to discretion:
In my opinion the standard of review of the substantive aspects of dis-
cretionary decisions is best approached within this [pragmatic and func-
179. Ibid. at para. 38.
180. [2000] 3 F.C. 282, 20 Admin. L.R. (3d) 159 (C.A.).
181. Ibid. at paras. 15-16.
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tional analysis] framework, especially given the difficulty of making rigid
classifications between discretionary and non-discretionary decisions ...
The spectrum of standards of review can incorporate the principle that,
in certain cases, the legislature has demonstrated its intention to leave
greater choices to decision-makers than in others, but that a court must
intervene where such a decision is outside the scope of the power ac-
corded by Parliament.
The pragmatic and functional approach can take into account the fact
that the more discretion that is left to a decision-maker, the more reluc-
tant courts should be to interfere with the manner in which the decision-
makers have made choices among various options. However, though dis-
cretionary decisions will generally be given considerable respect, that
discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed
in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of adminis-
trative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the prin-
ciples of the Charter.I"2
Weighing the various elements of the pragmatic and functional analy-
sis, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concluded that the decision of the Minister should
be judged against a reasonableness simpliciter standard."3
Before Baker, exercises of statutory discretion were typically reviewed
on grounds such as whether the administrator had fettered its discretion,
used its powers for improper purposes, or considered irrelevant consider-
ations (or failed to consider relevant ones). According to this approach, the
182. Baker, supra note 5 at paras. 55-56.
183. In the view of L'Heureux-Dub6 J., factors which militated against deference included the ab-
sence of a privative clause, and the fact that the issue involved related "directly to the rights and
interests of an individual in relation to the government, rather than balancing the interests of various
constituencies or mediating between them." (ibid. at para. 60) On the other hand, several factors
suggested that some degree of deference was called for, including the fact that "[t]he Minister has
some expertise relative to the courts in immigration maters, particularly with respect to when ex-
emptions should be given from the requirements that normally apply;" (ibid. at para. 59) that the
decision involved "considerable choice on the part of the Minister" (ibid. at para. 60) and involved
the application of "relatively 'open-textured' legal principles," (ibid. at para. 60) and that the nature
of the issue was "fact-specific." (ibid. at para. 62) The Court held that the decision failed the reason-
ableness test because the notes of the immigration officer, on which the decision was based, showed
the officer to have been "completely dismissive of the interests of Ms. Baker's children." (ibid. at
para. 65) L'Heureux-Dub6 J. went on to state:
I believe that the failure to give serious weight and consideration to the interests of the
children constitutes an unreasonable exercise of the discretion conferred by the section,
notwithstanding the important deference that should be given to the decision of the immi-
gration officer.... The reasons of the immigration officer show that his decision was
inconsistent with the values underlying the grant of discretion. They therefore cannot
stand up to the somewhat probing examination required by the standard of reasonable-
ness. (ibid. at para. 65)
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court was reviewing only the manner in which discretion was exercised,
rather than the substance of the decision itself. Review for these discreet
categories of error tended to be deferential, even if this was not completely
predicable. As with the pre-Pushpanathan approach to questions of fact,
the relationship between deference to exercises of discretion and the
deference mandated by patent unreasonableness remained unexplored,
unappreciated and unclear. The significance of the shift signalled in Baker
should not be underestimated (although it may be that the Supreme Court
has already, in Suresh, retreated somewhat from its position in Baker).1
4
After Baker, with discretion reviewed under the pragmatic and functional
analysis, it became clear that courts were no longer restricted to consider-
ing how the decision-maker went about exercising the discretion; the out-
come of that exercise was now open to review. Furthermore, a court could
be fairly interventionist. In Baker itself, reasonableness simpliciter was
184. Suresh, supra note 3, involved a determination by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
that Mr. Suresh constituted a danger to Canadian security and should be deported to Sri Lanka. Mr.
Suresh applied for judicial review, arguing that the Minister's decision was unreasonable, that the
decision-making process was flawed and that the relevant provisions of the ImmigrationAct violated
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Canada dis-
missed the constitutional argument, but ordered a new hearing on procedural grounds. Regarding
review of the Minister's exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court stated at paras. 29, 35, 37:
We agree ... that the reviewing court should adopt a deferential approach to this question and
should set aside the Minister's discretionary decision if it is patently unreasonable in the sense
that it was made arbitrarily or in bad faith, it cannot be supported on the evidence, or the
Minister failed to consider the appropriate factors. The court should not reweigh the factors or
interfere merely because it would have come to a different conclusion.
The Court's recent decision in Baker, supra, did not depart from this view. Rather, it
confirmed that the pragmatic and functional approach should be applied to all types of
administrative decisions in recognition of the fact that a uniform approach to the determi-
nation of the proper standard of review is preferable, and that there may be special situa-
tions where even traditionally discretionary decisions will best be reviewed according to
a standard other than the deferential standard which was universally applied in the past to
ministerial decisions ...
The passages in Baker referring to the "weight" of particular factors ... must be read in
this context. It is the Minister who was obliged to give proper weight to the relevant
factors and none other. Baker does not authorize courts reviewing decisions on the dis-
cretionary end of the spectrum to engage in a new weighing process, but draws on an
established line of cases concerning the failure of ministerial delegates to consider and
weigh limitations and/or patently relevant factors.
See also United States v. Kwok, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532, 197 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 18. The Minister
of Justice had ordered that the appellant be surrendered to the United States to stand trial on drug
trafficking charges. One of the matters to be considered by the Minister was whether the appellant
could be effectively prosecuted in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada stated, "[t]he Minister's
decision with respect to the appropriateness of domestic prosecution attracts a high degree of defer-
ence." See also the comments on the more recent restatement of the pragmatic and functional analy-
sis found in Dr. Q., supra note 16.
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applied, and there is nothing in the decision that precludes the possibility
of the correctness standard being used in the context of discretion. One of
the lower court decisions we reviewed noted expressly that the newer
approach opens the door for more rigorous review of discretionary
decisions. Thus, in Awuah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immi-
gration),"5 a case involving judicial review of a Ministerial decision un-
der the Immigration Act, the Court stated that Baker "overturned the tradi-
tional deferential approach given to discretionary decisions." '86
The application of the pragmatic and functional analysis in this context
has been widely accepted by the lower courts, although there were still a
few examples of the older approach. For instance, in Friends of Cypress
Provincial Park Society v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment,
Lands and Parks),'87 the Court applied the pre-Baker approach in review-
ing a Minister's discretionary decision to permit expansion of a recreation
facility. The Court stated that its function was to determine whether the
Minister had followed a lawful process, not whether the court would have
reached the same decision. In Blue Line Car Leasing Ltd. v. Halifax Inter-
national Airport,"" the Court appeared to merge the older approach with
that in Baker, in reviewing a discretionary decision of an airport manager.
The Court stated: "I am not persuaded that the manager's decision ... was
for an improper purpose or an irrelevant consideration. It was not patently
unreasonable."' 89 Similarly, in Jada Fishing v. Canada (Minister ofFish-
eries and Oceans), 90 the Court held that the reasonableness simpliciter
standard applied to a reconsideration of the Pacific Region Licence Ap-
peal Board regarding the discretionary allocation of fishing quotas. How-
ever, the Court's approach for determining the reasonableness of the deci-
sion calls to mind the pre-Baker approach to discretion. The Court asked
whether the Board had relied on relevant information in reaching its
decision.' 9'
In most cases involving discretion, however, lower courts seemed fairly
185. [1999] F.C.J. No. 1873 (T.D.).
186. Ibid. at para. 3.
187. (2000), 33 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 276, 2000 BCSC 466 [Cypress Park].
188. 2001 FCT 296 [Blue Line].
189. Ibid. at para. 27. Another reading of the Court's comments would be to see them not as reflect-
ing the older approach to discretion, but differentiating between those aspects of the older tests that
were by Baker subsumed into the pragmatic and functional analysis and those aspects which may
still stand separately. See discussion below.
190. (2001), 198 F.T.R. 161 (T.D.), aff'd (2002) 288 N.R. 237,41 Admin. L.R. (3d) 281, 2002 FCA
103. Leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 209.
191. See also Ahamad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 109, 184
F.T.R. 283 (T.D.).
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comfortable with the direction taken in Baker.192 Application of the
pragmatic and functional analysis led to varying results, depending on the
various factors involved. In very few cases involving discretion did the
pragmatic functional analysis lead to the application of the correctness
standard. 193 The bulk of the cases involving discretion measured the
decision of the administrative decision maker against either the not
patently unreasonable or the not unreasonable standard. In terms of
numbers, significantly more cases applied reasonableness simpliciter;
however quite a few of these involved immigration decisions. 94 When the
non-Immigration Act cases were compared, there was a fairly even
division between those where the discretionary decision was held to the
standard of patent unreasonableness and those where the standard of rea-
sonableness simpliciter was applied.'
There may still be some aspects of the judicial review of discretion that
do not fit within the pragmatic and functional analysis. One of the ques-
tions left unanswered after Baker was whether the pragmatic and func-
tional analysis had completely eclipsed previous approaches to the review
of discretionary decisions, with Mullan suggesting that:
On one side of the fence, it is clear that challenges based on bad faith or
acting under dictation will not be affected. On the other, taking account
192. See e.g. A.B.Z., supra note 22; Abdul-Karim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion) (2000), 191. F.T.R. 115, 9 Imm. L.R. (3d) 96 (T.D.) [Abdul-Karim].
193. In 3430901 Canada, supra note 19, the trial judge applied the standard of correctness to a
decision involving discretion on appeal; however, the Federal Court of Appeal separated the ques-
tion of whether certain information was exempt under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
A-1, into two questions: an issue of law regarding the interpretation of the relevant section and an
issue involving the Minister's discretion as to whether or not to disclose the particular information
being sought relating to licensing processes. On the Minister's refusal to disclose information, the
Federal Court of Appeal applied the reasonableness simpliciter standard. In East Luther Grand Val-
ley (Township o) v. Ontario (Minister of Environment and Energy) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 247, 33
C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 23 (Sup. Ct. J.) the Court interpreted Baker as holding that the correctness standard
cannot be applied to discretionary decisions (ibid. at para. 32).
194. See e.g. A.B.Z., supra note 22; Abdul-Karim, supra note 192; Bhardwaj v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 9 Imm. L.R. (3d) 170 (EC.T.D.); Gupta v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 186 F.T.R. 232, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 127 (T.D.); Legault v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] 3 EC. 277, 203 D.L.R. (4th) 450, 2001
FCT 315 (T.D.).
195. For instance, reasonableness was applied in Metro Toronto Police Services Board v. Ontario
(Municipal Employees Retirement Board (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 622, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 440 (C.A.) and
University of Saskatchewan v. Canada (Commissioner of the Plant Breeders Rights Office), [2001] 3
EC. 247, 11 C.P.R. (4th) 348, 2001 FCT 134, while not patently unreasonable was applied in BC
Landscape, supra note 44; Cypress Park, infra note 214; and Heisler v. Saskatchewan (Minister of
Environment and Resource Management), (1999), 186 Sask. R. 201, 16Admin. L.R. (3d) 215, 1999
SKQB 156.
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of irrelevant factors and failing to take account of relevant factors obvi-
ously come within its ambit. Acting for a wrongful purpose is more of a
problem.196
The Court's approach to discretion in Northeast Bottle Depot Ltd. v.
Alberta (Beverage Container Management Board),197 fits with Mullan's
understanding of the scope of the pragmatic and functional analysis. In
this case, a decision of the Beverage Container Management Board to grant
a permit for the operation of a new bottle recycling depot was challenged
on several grounds, including impermissible sub-delegation and improper
fettering of discretion. The Court dealt separately with these two challenges
to the Board's decision (concluding that administrative functions such as
issuing permits fell within an accepted exception to the non-delegation
rule, and that the complaint of fettering was not supported by the facts)
before moving on to the pragmatic and functional analysis and concluding
that the proper standard of review was patently unreasonable. Similarly,
in Moresby Explorers Ltd. v. Canada (A.G.), 9 ' the Federal Court Trial
Division dealt first with the allegation that the Superintendent of Parks
had improperly fettered his discretion and then proceeded to consider the
appropriate standard against which to review the Superintendent's exer-
cise of discretion. The Superintendent's decision to attach certain condi-
tions to a licence issued to the applicants was held to be reviewable against
the reasonableness standard. The exercise of discretion was seen as prima-
rily fact based, requiring the balancing of various issues, and engaging the
Superintendent's expertise. Nevertheless, the Court stated "there is not so
much difference in expertise that the Court should limit its intervention to
cases of patent unreasoniableness."19 9 In Heisler v. Saskatchewan (Minister
of Environment and Resource Management) ,20 also, issues of fettering and
improper delegation were dealt with separately from review of other
aspects of a discretionary decision of the Minister of the Environment.
20 1
196. Mullan, Administrative Law, supra note I at 112.
197. (2000), 269 A.R. 248, [2000] 11 W.WR. 331, 2000 ABQB 572 [Northeast Bottle].
198. Supra note 44.
199.Ibid. at para. 91.
200. Supra note 195.
201. See also Holland v. Canada (A.G.) (2000), 188 F.T.R. 305 (T.D.).
314 The Dalhousie Law Journal
3. Applying the Standards of Review
One of the areas that is most uncertain in the new substantive review
doctrine is the exact nature of the difference between review for patent
unreasonableness and review for unreasonableness simpliciter. In Southam,
lacobucci J. explained the difference as follows:
I conclude that the third standard [of review] should be whether the de-
cision of the Tribunal is unreasonable. This test is to be distinguished
from the most deferential standard of review, which requires courts to
consider whether a tribunal's decision is patently unreasonable. An un-
reasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by any
reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination. Accord-
ingly, a court reviewing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard
must look to see whether any reasons support it. The defect, if there is
one, could presumably be in the evidentiary foundation itself or in the
logical process by which conclusions are sought to be drawn from it. An
example of the former kind of defect would be an assumption that had
no basis in the evidence, or that was contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence. An example of the latter kind of defect would be a con-
tradiction in the premises or an invalid inference.
The difference between "unreasonable" and "patently unreasonable"
lies in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect. If the defect is appar-
ent on the face of the tribunal's reasons, then the tribunal's decision is
patently unreasonable. But if it takes some significant searching or test-
ing to find the defect, then the decision is unreasonable but not patently
unreasonable ... This is not to say, of course, that judges reviewing a
decision on the standard of patent unreasonableness may not examine
the record. If the decision under review is sufficiently difficult, then per-
haps a great deal of reading and thinking will be required before the
judge will be able to grasp the dimensions of the problem ... But once
the lines of the problem have come into focus, if the decision is patently
unreasonable, then the unreasonableness will be evident.2"2
More recently, in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, lacobucci J.,
again writing for the Court, rejected the idea that the reasonableness stan-
dard was a "floating one," sometimes closer to correctness and sometimes
closer to patent unreasonleness, depending on the circumstances of each
case for which it was found to be the appropriate standard of review. 203 He
further said that the difference between review for unreasonableness and
202. Southam, supra note 8 at paras. 56-57.
203. Ryan, supra note 8.
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correctness was that in the latter situation, the reviewing court must under-
take its own reasoning process to determine the result that it considers
correct. In contrast, in reviewing for unreasonableness, the court must never
ask if the challenged decision was correct, but only if the reasons given for
the decision can, when taken as a whole and subjected to a somewhat prob-
ing analysis, support the decision. He contrasted review for unreasonable-
ness with review for patent unreasonableness by again citing that the
difference lies in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect. In addition,
he also contrasted the two by saying that whereas a defect that makes a
decision patently unreasonable will be simple and easy to explain, leaving
no real doubt that the decision is defective, explaining why a decision is
unreasonable, "may require detailed exposition to show that there are no
lines of reasoning supporting the decision which could reasonably lead the
tribunal to reach the decision it did.""°4 In Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians
and Surgeons of British Columbia, McLachlin C.J. described review for
correctness as "exacting review," review for unreasonableness as "signifi-
cant searching and testing," and review for patent unreasonableness as
leaving the issue "to the near exclusive determination of the decision-
maker." '205
In contrast to this almost exquisite level of doctrinal refinement and
precision, we found that the lower courts frequently apply the various stan-
dards of review with little or no commentary on their understanding of
what the different standards of review mean. Even where there was some
discussion of this, it often took a fairly standardized form. Thus, in order
to describe the content of reasonableness simpliciter, courts turned rou-
tinely to the language of Iacobucci J. in Southam, to the effect that "[a]n
unreasonable decision is one that, in the main is not supported by any
reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination."206 They
would, however, rarely say anything as to what they understood this lan-
guage to mean. Patently unreasonable was often described as a "strict stan-
dard"2 7 or a "severe test,"208 or courts quoted from Cory J. in PS.A.C. to
say that a decision which is "not clearly irrational" 0 9 will withstand a patent
unreasonableness review. Again, Iacobucci J. in Southam was frequently
quoted to explain the difference between an unreasonable decision and a
204. Ibid. at para. 53,
205. Supra note 16 at para. 22.
206. Supra note 8 at 776.
207. See e.g. Apotex, supra note 22 at para. 86.
208. Daycon, supra note 161 at para. 23.
209. Supra note 8 at 963.
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patently unreasonable one, which is said to lie in the "immediacy or obvi-
ousness of the defect." ' As a result, review under the reasonableness stan-
dard "must be somewhat more searching" '' than if the review were one
for patent unreasonableness. Very rarely did the courts attempt to state
their own understanding of the difference between unreasonableness and
patent unreasonableness review.
Indeed, we found that it was not uncommon for courts to use the
language of reasonableness when applying the test of patent unreason-
ableness, suggesting that the court could have accomplished the same level
of scrutiny through a reasonableness analysis. For instance, in Alberta Union
of Provincial Employees, the Court held that the standard of patent
unreasonableness applied to the decision of an arbitrator in a labour mat-
ter. In upholding the decision, the court stated that it was "entirely reason-
able" '212 for the Board to consider the issues that it did. In A.B.Z., the Court
stated at one point that the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board
was "certainly not patently unreasonable ' 2I3 and at another that the Board's
conclusions were "reasonable." '214 Similarly, in Alberta v. Alberta (Labour
Relations Board), the Court, in applying the patent unreaonsonableness
standard, stated that the Board's analysis was "hardly irrational" 21 I and
later, that the Board gave "thoughtful and careful reasons for its conclu-
sions on a complex and difficult matter. '21 6 This language suggests that
the Court could have accomplished the same level of scrutiny while using
the reasonableness simpliciter standard. This was made explicit in
Hao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), where a judge
of the Federal Court Trial Division said, "I note that I have never been
convinced that 'patently unreasonable' differs in a significant way from
'unreasonable. "217
While some blurring between patent unreasonableness and unreason-
ableness was common, several courts also suggested that, in certain
contexts, there may be room for deference even within the correctness
210. In Southam, supra note 8 at para. 57, lacobucci J. states :
The difference between "unreasonable" and "patently unreasonable" lies in the immediacy
or obviousness of the defect. If the defect is apparent on the face of the tribunal's reasons,
then the tribunal's decision is patently unreasonable. But if it takes some significant search-
ing or testing to find the defect, then the decision is, unreasonable but not patently unreason-
able.
211. See e.g. Alberta (Minister of Municipal Affairs), supra note 24 at para. 39.
212. Supra note 85 at para. 25.
213. Supra note 22 at para. 9.
214.Ibid. at para. 11.
215. Supra note 144 at para. 90.
216.Ibid. at para. 95.
217. (2000), 184 FT.R. 246 (T.D.) at para. 9.
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standard. 2 '8 The decision in Gallant v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health
and Safety Compensation Commission)2 19 involved an appeal from the
Appeals Panel of the Workplace Heath Safety and Compensation
Commission of New Brunswick. The appeal turned on the interpretation
to be given the definition of "average net earnings" in the Workers'Com-
pensation Act. 220 Relying on the fact that this was an appeal on a question
of law, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that correctness was the
appropriate standard of review. 221 In reaching this conclusion, the major-
ity also stated that "[c]urial deference need not translate into the applica-
tion of a standard of judicial review that is less probing than 'correct-
ness.' 222 The possibility of deference within the correctness standard was
raised and discussed more fully in Northwood v. British Columbia (Forest
Practices Board),223 which involved judicial review of a recommendation
made in a Compliance Report of the Forest Practices Board. Lambert J.A.
(MacKenzie J.A. concurring) stated:
... the standard called "correctness" cannot be a rigid one. Reasons for
judgment of the judges of this Court are described as "opinions," in the
Court ofAppealAct ... Indeed judges often feel that they are not right or
wrong, correct or incorrect, in a particular case. Rather, they form opin-
ions. Almost all arguments about statutory interpretation in this Court,
and indeed arguments about many other questions, consist of reasoned
thinking supporting one view or the other. In the end, the judges tend
not to say that one argument is correct and the other incorrect. They say
that they adopt, accept or prefer one argument to the other and give their
opinions accordingly ... If an argument is made that deference on the
interpretation of the statute should be given to those who are experts in
its functioning, that does not mean that the standard of "correctness" is
being abandoned. What it means is that deference is being given through
acceptance of one of the arguments ... In such a situation, neither of the
competing arguments need be categorized as "wrong", but only one of
them is preferred. That one, but not the other ones, then meet the stan-
dard of "correctness".
224
218. This approach may not be limited to the lower courts. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
219. (2000), 228 N.B.R. (2d) 98, 191 D.L.R. (4th) 712 [Gallant].
220. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13, s. 38 .1(1).
221. Gallant, supra note 219 at para. 45. Rice J.A., while concurring that the Appeal Panel's inter-
pretation had been correct disagreed as to the standard of review, holding that when the tribunal's
"role and expertise in labour relations" were also taken into account, the reasonableness standard
ought to be applied.
222. Ibid. at para. 25.
223. Northwood, supra note 103.
224. Ibid. at para. 36.
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Lambert J.A. then listed reasons why,
... even on a "correctness" standard of review very considerable
deference ought to be given to the Forest Practices Board in choos-
ing which of the two "reasonable" arguments is to be preferred .
25
Lambert J.A. later stated that, "[a]pplying the standard of 'correctness',
coupled with an appropriate degree of deference to the assessment by the
Forest Practices Board of its own functions in the context of the objects of
the Forest Practices Code, 226 the Board's decision was to be upheld. Hall
J.A. concurred in the outcome but stated "I do not find it necessary to
comment on the matters raised by my colleague '2 7 in the paragraphs deal-
ing with deference and correctness.
The suggestion that a degree of deference may be incorporated into the
correctness standard was also found in Canada (A.G.) v. Public Service
Alliance of Canada .228 This case involved judicial review of a decision of
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal regarding a pay equity complaint.
Given Canada (A. G.) v. Mossop, in which the Supreme Court applied a
correctness standard to the Tribunal's determination of legal issues, the
Court felt that it could not re-determine the appropriate standard of re-
view; however, it found that the section of the Canadian Human Rights
Act229 dealing with pay equity, "was enacted at the level of a principle, and
requires for its implementation mastery of a range of technical knowledge
of considerable sophistication, and a thorough understanding of the given
workplace. ' 230 Given the lengthy hearing before the Tribunal, where some
of the presentations "resembled educational seminars," the court concluded
that Tribunal members were likely better placed than a judge to under-
stand "the problems of operationalizing the principle of pay equity."23'
These cases raise the question of whether either the reasoning or the
result would have been different had the Court simply applied the reason-
ableness standard. This sense from at least some of the cases that the bound-
aries between the different levels of scrutiny are rather permeable, when
coupled with our observation that the initial decision is upheld about half
the time even where correctness is identified as the approropriate stan-
225. Ibid. at para. 38.
226. Ibid. at para. 42.
227. Ibid. at para. 46.
228. (1999), [2000] 1 F.C. 146, 180 D.L.R. (4th) 95 (T.D.) [Public Service Alliance].
229. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
230. Public Service Alliance, supra note 228 at para. 80.
231. Ibid. at para. 86.
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dard, suggests that, despite the importance ascribed by the Supreme Court
to determining the appropriate standard of review, this determination does
not always affect the outcome.232 This possibility was certainly implicit in
cases where the court did not identify the standard of review at all, instead
simply stating how the board or tribunal should have decided, and was
explicit in those cases where the court did select a standard of review, but
noted that the outcome would be the same even if another standard were
applied.
In reading the cases, we also paid attention to signs that the selection of
the reasonableness simpliciter or patent unreasonableness standard
signaled that the court saw the issue under review as one which might lend
itself to a number of different resolutions, at least several of which might
be equally "correct." This question has appeared and reappeared in the
jurisprudence and literature at least since C.U.PE., where Dickson J.
suggested that one of the indicators for deference would be legislation
which could be interpreted in a number of ways, none of which was
patently unreasonable. A number of lower court decisions suggested a per-
spective consistent with Dickson J.'s approach in C. U.E. The recogni-
tion that there might be a range of options for an administrative decision-
maker to choose from was perhaps most evident in cases involving the
exercise of discretion. 33 For instance, in Philippines (Republic) v.
Pacificador,234 a case involving a decision of the Minister of Justice to
deport an individual to the Philippines for trial on various charges, the
decision was challenged on several grounds including that the Minister
had not taken sufficient account of the dangers of torture and an unfair
trial if Mr. Pacificador were deported. The Court held that the reasonable-
ness standard applied to this portion of the decision, and then held that
there was nothing "illogical or unreasonable with the Minister's analy-
sis" '235 of the situation in the Philippines. The Court acknowledged that it
might not be in the best position to judge the issues before the Minister
and for this reason, deference was appropriate. This stance suggests that
232. We certainly do not argue that the selection of a standard of review is completely irrelevant;
there is an increased pattern of deference as one moves from correctness to reasonableness simplic-
iter to patent unreasonableness. Yet for the reasons given above, we question whether the determi-
nation of the standard of review actually carries the weight that would seem to be implied by the
amount of doctrine developed around this determination.
233. See e.g. Lethbridge, supra note 120; Devlin v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia, 2000 BCSC 1271, aff'd (2002), 171 B.C.A.C. 251, 2002 BCCA 419.
234.(1999), 60 C.R.R. (2d) 126 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff'd [1999] O.J. No. 3866 (Sup. Ct. J.), rev'd
(sub. nom. Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Pacificador) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 685, 216 D.L.R. (4th)
47 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 390.
235. Ibid. at para. 63.
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the Court did not see itself as measuring the Minister's decision against
the correct answer as chosen by the court. A number of other cases not
involving discretion reflected a similar approach.
236
In other cases, it seemed clear that the court did perceive there to be
only one correct answer, despite the application of the patent unreason-
ableness standard. Sometimes, however, it may have been the nature of
the issue in question which led a court to conclude that there was only one
correct answer, even when the appropriate standard of review was identi-
fied as patent unreasonableness. In Brown v. Workers Compensation
Board,237 the Court reviewed a decision of the Workers' Compensation
Board, which had refused to include a physiatrist on a list of specialists
from which a medical review panel would be chosen to decide whether an
applicant with a muscular-skeletal disability was entitled to benefits. The
Court stated that the applicable standard of review was patent unreason-
ableness, yet in overturning the decision, described the issue as "quite
straightforward," given that the applicant had a muscular-skeletal disabil-
ity and that this "is the very thing which a physiatrist diagnoses and treats. 238
In this case, however, the Board really only had two choices; it could agree
to include this particular type of medical professional on the specialist list,
or it could refuse to do so. If refusing would, in this context, be patently
unreasonable, then despite the fact that the most deferential level of scru-
tiny was chosen, really there was only one decision which would with-
stand that scrutiny.
This discussion also calls to mind Sopinka J.'s suggestion in Canadian
Assn. of Industrial, Mechanical andAllied Workers, Local 14 v. Paccar of
Canada Ltd.,239 that even where patent unreasonableness is the appropri-
236. See e.g. Conkova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] FC.J. No. 300
(T.D.), in which an applicant for refugee status claimed that she was a Roma and therefore subjected
to persecution. The Convention Refugee Determination Division panel hearing the claim found that
Ms. Conkova was not a Roma. On judicial review, the Federal Court Trial Division stated "[t]he
view which the CRDD took of the evidence was one that could reasonably be taken, just as the
opposing view could also reasonably be taken. The evidence, as is so often the case, is ambiguous
and equivocal... So long as its [the CCRD's] conclusion is not one which is wrong on its face, it is
not patently unreasonable." (ibid. at para. 5) See also Huron (County) Huronview Home for the
Aged v. Service Employees' Union, Local 210 50 O.R. (3d) 766, 27 Admin. L.R. (3d) 309 (C.A.),
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 646, involving judicial review of the decision
of an arbitrator under a collective agreement. The employer laid off employees because of cuts in
funding; the arbitrator interpreted the clause in the collective agreement giving the employer the
authority to determine the number of employees needed at any time as referring only to layoffs
caused by lack of work. On judicial review, the Court of Appeal stated, "[in my view, the arbitrator's
interpretation was one that the colective agreement could reasonably and logically bear, and it fol-
lows that it was not open to the Divisional Court to interfere." (ibid. at para. 22)
237. Supra note 44.
238. Ibid. at para. 22.
239. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983, 62 D.L.R. (4th) 437 [Paccar].
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ate standard of review, a court should first ask whether the decision is
correct, and only if the answer is no, need the court go on to consider
whether the decision should nonetheless be allowed to stand as not pa-
tently unreasonable. Although Sopinka J.'s approach in Pacccar has been
criticized, 240 and has as well been rejected clearly by the Supreme Court,
related thinking can still be seen in a number of the recent lower court
decisions on standard of review. While none of these cases stated that a
decision was wrong but should be upheld anyway through the application
of the reasonableness simpliciter or patent unreasonableness standards, a
number of cases, discussed above, did state that the decision was correct,
even though the pragmatic and functional analysis had led the courts to
conclude that a deferential standard of review was appropriate.1
4'
Sometimes it was not clear whether the court adhered to the view of
Dickson J. or of Sopinka J. on this issue. Thus in C.B. v. Manitoba, the
Court quashed a decision of the Child Abuse Registry Review Committee
to place the applicant's name on the abuse registry. The Court stated that
the majority of the Committee had "erred in law in its interpretation of the
term 'abuse'...such an interpretation...is, in my view, patently
unreasonable. ' 242  On this wording, did the Court see the Committee's
interpretation of "abuse" as simply too far removed from the correct inter-
pretation, or did it recognize a range of possible interpretations that would
240. For instance, Bryden speaks of the "awkward situation that arises in the wake of a judicial
decision that indicates that an administrative tribunal has erred in interpreting the provisions of a
statute oT collective agreement but that upholds the tribunal's decision on a basis that the tribunal's
decision was not patently unreasonable." (Philip Bryden, "Inside, Outside and Around Tribunals:
Administrative Practice Today" (Paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education Programme, 1 November 1996) at 44) Bryden suggests that this awkward situation both
invites judicial review and "in the eyes of the public, undermines the credibility of our system of
judicial review because the courts are affirming administrative decisions that they acknowledge to
be incorrect" (ibid. at 45). Similarly, Mullan, Administrative Law, supra note 1 at 71, suggests that
Sopinka's approach in Paccar "conflicts with the whole notion that Dickson J. espoused in
... [C.U.P.E.] that there is no single correct answer to statutory interpretation problems" and that "it
assumes the primacy of the reviewing court over the agency or tribunal in delineating the meaning of
the relevant statute."
241. At least at first glance, a court labelling a decision as not only not patently unreasonable but
correct may seem less problematic than a court labelling a decision as not patently unreasonable but
wrong. However, the awkwardness that Bryden, ibid., speaks of arises here too. If there really is a
range of acceptable interpretations which would be upheld on judicial review or appeal then a court
should be willing on other occasions to uphold any one of these interpretations; yet once the court
has pronounced one approach to be correct, this would seem to invite appeals or applications for
judicial review, if the administrative decision maker uses a different interpretation in a future case.
And, to follow Bryden's criticism, if the later interpretation were challenged, the court would have
to choose between showing less than the appropriate deference or undermining public confidence by
upholding an interpretation that deviates from that one previously labelled as correct.
242. Supra note 126 at para. 21.
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survive scrutiny on a standard of patent unreasonableness but conclude
that this particular interpretation was outside the pale?
As noted above, probably the most noteworthy observation regarding
how courts carry out substantive review of administrative decision-mak-
ing is the level of deference shown to administrative decision-makers. In
significant measure, this has as much to do with how standards of review
are applied as with the choice between standards of review. In at least
two-thirds of the cases we reviewed, the decision of the board or tribunal
was upheld by the reviewing court. When cases involving Immigration
Act issues (where courts tend to be more interventionist) are separated out,
the administrative decision was upheld nearly three-quarters of the time.
Where the standard of review was set at patently unreasonable, overwhelm-
ingly the decision under review or on appeal was confirmed by the court,
and a very significant level of deference was shown to decisions held to
the reasonableness standard as well. Even where the standard of correct-
ness was applied, the decision of the administrative decision-maker was
overturned only about half the time. Most of the cases where the correct-
ness standard of review was applied involved issues characterized by the
courts as questions of law, questions of jurisdiction, or sometimes both.
Where an issue was labelled jurisdictional, it was much more likely that
the decision would be quashed than where it was simply labelled as a ques-
tion of law.
Interestingly, there was significantly less deference shown in cases
where courts did not identify any standard of review. In fact, an adminis-
trative decision was more likely to be overturned if no standard of review
was specified, than if the standard was set at correctness. It also seemed
that choice of standard of review was affected by the area of law involved,
which presumably also reflected the courts' acceptance of certain admin-
istrative decision-makers as particularly expert in their fields. Thus, a pre-
ponderance of cases involving the review of decisions of labour relations
boards are dealt with under the patent unreasonableness standard, while
cases involving most other areas of law seemed more evenly spread across
the various standards of review. Immigration law appears, in contrast, to
be a field in which correctness is becoming the widely if not generally
applied standard of review.
After the Revolution
III. Reflections
We began with two rationales for wanting to know more about how (and
if) Supreme Court substantive review doctrine was being implemented in
a large cross-section of trial and court of appeal decisions. The first ratio-
nale, derived from the quantity and complexity of doctrinal change in sub-
stantive review law, was the need to know more about the extent to which
the doctrine is being applied in lower courts and, where applied, the
doctrine's usefulness. The second rationale lay in the high context-depen-
dency that now represents the methodological core of substantive review
law, and that consequently makes the operational effect of the doctrine
particularly dependent on how it is understood and applied by the judge or
judges who decide each individual case of substantive review. Underlying
both rationales were two basic goals. The first was to understand what role
the doctrine plays in how judges who are required to answer most substan-
tive review questions conceive, analyze and think about these questions.
The second was to ascertain whether the judicial policies that prevail in
the making of substantive review doctrine, primarily at the Supreme Court,
also prevail in the implementation of that doctrine in other courts.
What we have learned (or perhaps confirmed) is that Canada's trial
courts and courts of appeal are generally deciding substantive review cases
by applying the most recent and canonical decisions in the Supreme Court's
corpus of substantive review jurisprudence. In general, trial judges and
courts of appeal conduct substantive review by selecting a standard of re-
view from the spectrum that has been recognized and applied by the Su-
preme Court in numerous cases, but especially in the three cases (Southam,
Pushpanathan and Baker) that collectively contain much of the current
law's basic doctrinal infrastructure. Further, trial judges and courts of ap-
peal fairly consistently make these standard of review choices by acknowl-
edging their obligation to use a pragmatic and functional analysis as they
are mandated to do by these and other Supreme Court cases. A high de-
gree of consistency is quickly observable in the language, concepts and
authorities that lower courts invoke throughout the cross-section of lower
court substantive review jurisprudence that we reviewed. This consis-
tency embraced trial courts and courts of appeal in every judicial jurisdic-
tion. It also embraced substantive review in appeal as well as judicial
review proceedings, in cases involving privative clauses and cases where
the statute under consideration lacked such a provision, as well as in cases
concerned with questions of law, of fact, and of mixed law and fact, as
well as with those concerned with the exercise of discretionary powers.
At the same time, our review of the cases revealed another pattern of
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contrary import. This is the tendency of Canadian courts, especially at the
trial level, to reach conclusions in substantive review cases both about the
standard of review and the application of the standard with only minimal
explanation or analysis as to how or why those conclusions flow from the
application of general principles to the specific factual and legal context
for the decision being reviewed. In a large number of cases, what might be
called "the analysis" consists of little more than referencing and perhaps
quoting from Pushpanathan, Baker, and other Supreme Court cases, as if
these cases established precise legal rules that need only be stated to be
applied. Very frequently, the quick conclusion that a question is or is not of
jurisdictional quality, and therefore subject either to review for correct-
ness or for patent unreasonableness, is the substitute of choice for analysis.
But the apparent desire to decide cases by applying a simple rule, a
precedent, a principle or a concept, instead of by conducting a fully
contextualized analysis guided by such of these as are available and rel-
evant, is by no means limited to cases that are capable of being thought of
as concerning jurisdictional questions. For example, it is even more obvi-
ous in the way that Southam, which applied the standard of reasonableness
simpliciter to a question of mixed law and fact after a full pragmatic and
functional analysis, is often cited as authority for a general legal principle
that reasonableness is the standard of review wherever the question is one
of mixed law and fact. Similarly, one of the reasons for the widespread
application of the reasonableness standard of review to exercises of dis-
cretion is that Baker is frequently taken to have decided that reasonable-
ness is the standard of review for discretionary action, rather than as an
example of how a nuanced pragmatic and functional analysis, such as that
carried out in Baker itself, can produce a standard of review that is appro-
priate for each individual review of discretionary action. Of course, this is
almost certainly changed after Suresh, where the Supreme Court has virtu-
ally established a presumption that the standard of review for discretion-
ary action will be patent unreasonableness.
243
Such findings are perhaps not startling. Given our judicial traditions
and the organization of our court system, we should expect to find lower
courts at least using the cases that are now the authoritative pronounce-
ments from the Supreme Court on substantive review law. Likewise, we
should not be surprised to find the lower courts, and especially trial courts,
applying a simplified or abbreviated version of the total doctrinal package,
243. Suresh, supra note 3. Again, however, see the comments at supra note 16, regarding the seem-
ingly broader language in Dr. Q.
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solely on the basis of its relative newness and its complexity. Indeed, simi-
lar observations about how the lower courts apply Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on substantive review have been made by Wade MacLauchlan
in his excellent article on the Supreme Court's didactic role in administra-
tive law, based on his review of a run of cases that started later (after Baker)
and finished earlier (early 2001) than the cross-section of cases reviewed
here. 244 He notes a superficial adherence by the lower courts to the
direction being provided by the Supreme Court, primarily in the invoca-
tion of the language of pragmatic functionalism and in the common
citation of one or more of a consistent set of leading Supreme Court cases
that included Pushpanathan as well as Baker. But like us, he noticed that
lower court analysis put more reliance on the form than on the substance
of pragmatic functionalism. For example, he observed the absence of,
"widespread evidence, especially at the trial level, that courts truly engage
in a functional assessment of the interpretive capacity of administrative
decision-makers. '' 245 He also noted that, "The analysis remains largely at
the level of the application of labels, most of them related to the intention
of the legislature. ' 246 As in our review, the most prominent of these labels
in MacLauchlan's review was the tendency to determine the standard of
review by differentiating between questions about and questions within
jurisdiction.
Where our analysis departs somewhat from MacLauchlan's is with his
conclusion that the continuing formalism of lower courts in substantive
review cases largely reflects a lack of commitment to pragmatic function-
alism and (or) a lack of understanding of how it is to be done. Here, we
return to yet a third pattern that we see cutting across the cases. Our re-
view shows not only that the lower courts are using language, concepts
and an analytical framework that are consistent with the revolutionized
doctrine, but that they are doing so to produce outcomes that cumulatively
run fairly strongly in favour of curial deference and against frequent judi-
cial intermeddling in administrative matters. For example, over roughly a
four year period, the lower courts used the pragmatic and functional analysis
to find unreasonableness simpliciter or patent unreasonableness to be the
standard of review roughly twice as often as they found correctness to be
the appropriate standard of review. Patent unreasonableness was even some-
times applied in appeal cases, which takes deference in that context fur-
244. MacLauchlan, supra note 1.
245. Ibid. at 292.
246. Ibid.
326 The Dalhousie Law Journal
ther than has the Supreme Court. Where review for unreasonableness or
for patent unreasonableness was applied, the courts left the administrative
decision in place nearly five-sixths of the time. Even where review for
correctness was determined to be appropriate or necessary, marginally more
administrative decisions were upheld than were quashed. Indeed, several
cases clearly recognized doctrinal scope for deference within correctness
review and again, these courts appear to be somewhat ahead of the Su-
preme Court on this question. Overall, we found that courts overturned the
administrative decision on substantive grounds in roughly one third of the
cases, but this rate of intervention drops to between 25 and 30% when
immigration and refugee case (where intervention runs closer to 40%) are
excluded from the calculations. It is also significant that in labour rela-
tions cases, the historic epicenter of judicial resistance to administrative
autonomy, the standard of review that is applied is almost routinely that of
patent unreasonableness. In all but a few of such cases, it was applied to
leave the decision of the labour relations board or collective agreement
arbitrator in place.
Of course, we appreciate that the setting aside of the administrative
decision in a quarter or more of the cases is not an inconsequential rate of
judicial intervention. But it is a lower rate of intervention than we would
have expected, given that some rate of judicial intervention is obviously
not only to be expected but required by the fundamental constitutional
imperatives that are served by judicial supervision of the exercise of del-
egated statutory authority. It also seems low given the difficulty that the
courts have had historically in embracing curial deference as a fundamen-
tal principle of their relationship with the administrative state.247
In sum, it seems to us that the lower courts are not only talking the
walk but also to some extent walking it. It is true that they often do not
engage with each administrative decision in its total factual and legal con-
text to nearly the same degree as does the Supreme Court when it is called
on to apply the pragmatic and functional analysis. But they are, at least at
the macro level, getting to the outcomes that are globally in accord with
the policy behind pragmatic functionalism. They appear, in other words,
247. The Supreme Court's retreat from the spirit if not the letter of C.UPE., supra note 8, during the
1980's presents a classic example of this difficulty. The cases most often mentioned in this context
are still Syndicat des employes deproduction du Quebec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Labour Relations
Board), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412, 55 N.R. 321; and Bibeault, supra note 8. For examples of the academic
criticism that these cases generated, see Brian A. Langille, "Judicial Review, Judicial Revisionism
and Judicial Responsibility" (1986) 17 R.G.D. 169 and J.M. Evans, "Developments in Administra-
tive Law: The 1984-85 Term" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1. A history of the ebb and flow of curial
deference post-C.UP.E was also provided by Wilson J. in National Corn Growers, supra note 8.
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to be exercising considerable restraint and to be generally animated by at
least an expectation if not a presumption that they will generally not inter-
vene to quash administrative decisions on their merits.
In our view, these patterns suggest that a culture of respect for admin-
istrative autonomy and expertise may be putting down roots throughout
and across the superior courts. They suggest, in other words, that lower
court judges are for the most part applying the language, concepts and
doctrinal framework found in cases such as Pushpanathan, not only
because they are obviously bound to follow the law as stated by the
Supreme Court, but also, because they understand and accept the policy
objectives of that law. Why do we say this? The reason lies again, in the
highly discretionary quality of the adjudicative responsibility given to
judges under the current doctrinal framework. This means that a formula
for the application of either the pragmatic and functional analysis or of the
various standards of review is not capable of being doctrinally mandated
for the lower courts by the Supreme Court. It seems therefore, that since
lower courts are arriving at deferential outcomes considerably more often
than not, they must be doing so with some appreciation that this is what is,
in general terms, expected of them. To put it a little differently, if the lower
courts were not at some level committed to curial deference, they would
have the adjudicative latitude to depart from it much more frequently at
the level of outcome than they do.
The tendency of lower courts toward performing the pragmatic and
functional analysis in a rather sketchy or pro forma fashion may seem
disconcerting in light of the centrality ascribed to this analysis by the
Supreme Court. This was the view expressed by MacLauchlan after his
briefer review of doctrinal application in the lower courts. We submit that
the analytical brevity of the lower courts becomes less disconcerting when
the review of lower courts' decision-making goes beyond their selection
of standards of review to considering the outcomes that are reached through
their application of standards of review. There, the concept ofjudicial def-
erence appears to be clearly understood, and applied in ways that seem
both to reflect the underlying purpose of judicial oversight of administra-
tive decision-makers and to provide a sense of "rough justice" in terms of
where the court intervenes and where it does not.
Our suggestion is that there may be other reasons for the missing analysis
behind substantive review outcomes in the lower courts than lack of judi-
cial commitment to deference and functionalism, or lack of an understand-
ing of what is involved in being deferential and functional. The reason
may instead be that lower court judges do not always find fulsome prag-
matic and functional analysis to be useful or necessary in reaching out-
comes that are consistent with the commitment to both deference and func-
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tionalism that they in fact do share with the Justices of the Supreme Court.
In addition, it may be that such an analysis is not always feasible, either
because of a lack of the necessary information, as MacLauchlan notes, or
because of the press of other judicial business, especially at the trial court
level.
248
Our exposure to pragmatic functionalism in action convinces us that
an over-all picture of how courts interact with administrative decision-
makers can be gained only by looking at outcomes as well as at the pro-
cesses through which those outcomes are reached, such as standard of re-
view determinations. This relates to the skepticism that we expressed in
our introduction regarding the usefulness of the current approach to sub-
stantive review of administrative decision-making. In particular, we ap-
proached our research with considerable doubt about whether it is neces-
sary or even useful to have a spectrum of at least three standards of review,
any one of which could (at least in theory) be applied to any decision
under review, whether by an application for judicial review or a statutory
appeal. This is not to deny that there is continued value in having courts
reflect explicitly on how much deference should be shown to a particular
decision; if the immigration and refugee cases that we reviewed provide
any guide, it does appear that the absence of any attempt at articulating a
standard of review tends to lead to greater judicial intervention. However,
it may be possible that a somewhat simplified doctrine might still achieve
the salutary effect of restraining judges from simply re-deciding whatever
comes before them on review or appeal whenever that is what they want to
do. The current framework seems to dictate that a significant amount of
time and effort go into selecting the appropriate standard of review; yet, it
is somewhat unusual to find a thorough pragmatic and functional analysis.
In response, one could simply berate lower court judges for continuing to
"get it wrong" or one might consider whether there is a message here re-
garding the undue complexity of the current analysis, Arguably, the fact
that in approximately two-thirds of the cases, judges chose one of the two
deferential standards and then, very frequently, proceeded to uphold the
decision being challenged suggests that it might be possible, at a mini-
mum, to collapse the standards of reasonableness and of patent unreason-
248. See Laverne A. Jacobs & Thomas S. Kuttner, "Discovering What Tribunals Do: Tribunal Stand-
ing Before the Courts" (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rev. 616, where it is argued that the question of tribunal
standing should itself be answered pragmatically and functionally, rather than on the basis of for-
malist distinctions between jurisdictional and intra-jurisdictional questions, and particularly, with
reference to tribunal capacity to provide information relevant and helpful to the larger pragmatic
and functional analysis regarding selection and application of the standard of review.
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ableness into one comprehensive standard of deferential review. 249
We admit to some trepidation in making this suggestion. Our study of
pragmatic functionalism in operation suggests that there is currently con-
siderable alignment between the pattern of outcomes being produced and
the objectives of the law, as articulated in Supreme Court decisions. Spe-
cifically, the stability and relative predictability that has been achieved in
particular administrative fields, such as labour law, should not be lightly
jeopardized. Nevertheless, it seems to us that a more generalized reliance
on review for simple unreasonableness might allow and encourage judges
to spend more time thinking about what is actually reasonable in particular
contexts, and why, rather than grappling with attempts to explain why they
have chosen one of the deferential standards over the other, or what the
difference between the two actually is. Moreover, based on what we see in
the lower court decisions, we believe that such a change presents little risk
of an increase in inappropriate interventionism. Given that administrative
decisions are upheld half the time even when the correctness standard is
chosen and that at least a few courts are starting to explore the possibility
of locating some degree of deference within correctness itself, it may even
be worthwhile to consider whether it is possible to move to a single stan-
dard of review - contextualized reasonableness - or at least to ask what
the draw-backs of such an approach might be. We have just begun to ask
ourselves the questions that such a development would raise, particularly
relative to such issues as the implications for and from section 96 of the
Constitution Act, 1867,250 for the interpretation and application of priva-
tive clauses, the judicial review of the decisions of human rights adjudica-
tors, and so on. In this regard, the most that this article does is to provide
modest empirical and pragmatic support and pragmatic considerations for
a doctrinal change that has been strongly argued for on theoretical
249. The very recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have reaffirmed the Court's commit-
ment to a spectrum of standards of review that includes three distinct standards. Also, the Court has
served notice that, contrary to some comments in earlier decisions, it does not foresee the recogni-
tion of additional standards of review to the three already recognized. Further, the Court has stated
in very strong terms that reasonableness simpliciter is a fixed standard of review, not one that slides
along the spectrum, sometimes being truly between correctness and patent unreasonableness and
sometimes being closer to one than the other (see Ryan, supra note 8). On the other hand, during our
final edits of this paper, the Court decided Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees,
Local 79 (C. UPE.), 2003 SCC 63, in which Lebel J. (Deschamps J. concurring) contemplates the
possible future merger of review for unreasonableness and review for patent unreasonableness in a
concurring judgment (see ibid. at paras. 120-34). Many of the considerations that are said to point in
this direction are consistent with the observations that are drawn in this paper from the experience of
the lower courts.
250. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
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grounds.251 Our study suggests that Canadian judges have, in significant
degree, internalized the respect for the distinctive expertise of administra-
tive decision-makers that is such a fundamental part of the doctrinal change
that has taken place over the past quarter century. It is therefore question-
able whether their continuing commitment to curial deference depends
upon the formal existence of a spectrum of standards of review that re-
minds them that some cases are farther beyond their realm of expertise
than are others. Meanwhile, there are considerable gains to be achieved in
the potential for increased transparency in substantive review adjudication
that may come from greater judicial attention to the differentiation of rea-
sonable administrative interpretations and findings from unreasonable ones.
At the same time, we appreciate that deference is not always the appro-
priate judicial posture and that deference is not somehow intrinsically su-
perior to intervention in all circumstances. The legal framework for sub-
stantive review has evolved beyond the point where its overriding goal
was to substitute a culture of deference for a culture of intervention. Now,
the goal is to differentiate between the cases that call for intervention and
the cases that call for deference. The underlying premise of a spectrum
that always extends from correctness to patent unreasonableness through
unreasonableness is that the law is as much concerned with ensuring judi-
cial intervention where that is appropriate as it with counselling restraint
in many more situations. We would suggest however, that against the back-
ground of the large literature that has been dedicated to calls for greater
judicial recognition of administrative autonomy, the true concern with a
generally applicable standard of reasonableness must surely be that it would
undermine deference, not that it would prevent courts from intervening
where they currently do so under the correctness standard. In other words,
the concern with a generally applicable standard of reasonableness must
be the loss of review for patent unreasonableness, not the loss of review
for correctness. Our review of lower court decision-making suggests that
this concern, if once valid, may be less valid now. Trial courts and courts
of appeal are broadly deferential in their approach to the review of admin-
istrative decisions. Our impression from the cases is that this is not be-
cause the distinction between unreasonableness and patent unreasonable-
ness reminds them to keep their interventionist urges under control. Rather,
in our view, it is because Canadian courts have by and large accepted the
fundamental legitimacy of the legislative decision to delegate decision-
making authority across many fields of social and economic life to tribu-
251. Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 3.
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nals and other administrative agencies. Conversely, our review suggests
that there should be little concern about the courts losing the capacity (or
the willingness) to intervene in cases where they currently intervene under
the correctness standard. In significant measure, cases that are now
assessed for correctness defacto are already decided on the basis of an
assessment of reasonableness. Often, this is an unavoidable consequence
of the open-ended nature of the questions of law that come to administra-
tors for decision and to courts for review.
We have one further and alternative suggestion for doctrinal evolution
that may, at first glance, appear contradictory. It is that consideration be
given to building on the foundation that Pushpanathan established for ei-
ther abandoning or constraining the jurisdictional principle as the basis for
judicial review. On this, our analysis of lower court cases has led us to the
same conclusion as MacLauchlan. It strongly indicates that many (per-
haps most) Canadian judges still conceive of the differentiation between
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions as the fundamental issue in
substantive review cases involving legislation with a privative clause. One
of the manifestations of this is the general tendency across the cases to
give the presence of a privative clause prevailing weight under the prag-
matic and functional analysis, in virtually all circumstances. The result is
that such clauses almost always reduce the standard of review spectrum to
the options of correctness and of patent unreasonableness. We therefore
found very little exploration within the lower court cases of the implica-
tions of Bastarache J.'s openness in Pushpanathan to the outweighing of a
privative clause by other variables in the analysis.
This means that Canadian judges are only exceptionally substituting
review for unreasonableness for review for patent unreasonableness for
questions that arise under a privative clause. For the most part, the lower
courts at least do not appear to be even considering the possibility, and this
may be a reflection of the fact that the Supreme Court itself has not built
upon the comments of Mr. Justice Bastarache. This may all come as a
relief to the drafters of legislation who are instructed, in the face of the
changed terrain of judicial review, to protect administrative autonomy
through legislative means. The continuing security of privative clauses is
significant, given our finding that there is more judicial intervention into
administrative decision-making under reasonableness than under patent
unreasonableness. But just as the courts are not substituting reasonable-
ness for patent unreasonableness in cases involving a privative clause, so
are they not substituting unreasonableness for correctness. Moreover, it
should be recalled here that in our cases, the courts were more likely to
overturn decisions that they reviewed for correctness when they character-
ized the decision as not only depending on a legal question but on a legal
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question that went to jurisdiction. In addition, the cases showed a signifi-
cant tendency to associate legal questions with jurisdiction, a tendency
that recent Supreme Court statements on what types of questions go with
which standards of review may be accentuating. This tendency is arguably
evident in Southam,'52 and Pushpanathan253 themselves, as well as in later
cases such as Mattel'54 and Dr. Q.,211 which together illustrate an appar-
ently growing tendency to equate what were referred to as questions of
"pure law" 256 in Dr. Q. to questions ofjurisdiction. Thus, in various ways,
the continuing emphasis on jurisdiction as an organizing concept is con-
straining analysis in ways that might mean less curial deference overall or
alternatively, less true calibration between scope and intensity of review
and the facts and law of each particular decision.
We are aware that it may seem contradictory to be arguing for a change
that will open more cases to the full spectrum of review standards while
otherwise arguing for the elimination (or at least for a reduction in scope)
of at least one and perhaps two of the standards of review. There is
however, consistency with our more fundamental point, that doctrinal
simplification may be a key ingredient to facilitating consistent judicial
concentration with greater transparency and accountability on the quality
of administrative decision-making, not doctrinal categories. In addition,
we note that in the body of cases reviewed here, substantive review did
tend to gravitate towards a single standard of review, that of reasonable-
ness, where the choice of standard was unconstrained by a privative clause
and therefore, by the limiting concept ofjurisdiction. Thus, the intermedi-
ate standard of review for unreasonableness simpliciter might evolve into
a dominant and even all-encompassing standard of review, due to a combi-
nation of pull and push dynamics that might be expected to come to the
fore with the elimination of the concept of jurisdictional questions and
therefore, with the final barrier between appeal and judicial review cases
and between cases with and cases without privative clauses. One of these
factors may simply be that review for unreasonableness is in fact just what
it is - an intermediate standard of review that appears from the cases to
be attractive as a "split-the-difference" outcome, especially when the fac-
tors that are considered under the pragmatic and functional analysis point
252. Supra note 8.
253. Supra note 6.
254. Supra note 138.
255. Supra note 16.
256. Ibid. at para. 34.
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in opposite directions. Indeed, the stated rationale for review for
unreasonableness as a half-way house between correctness and patent un-
reasonableness is precisely this, that it is virtually necessitated by cases in
which some factors point to deference and others to intervention. In our
view, the implications may run strongly in favour of an expanding middle
in standard of review analysis, provided the availability of review for
unreasonableness in privative clause cases becomes more generally
accepted. Given the complexity of most administrative statutes and, in
particular, the ubiquitous tension in statutory design between the objec-
tives of conferring and constraining statutory authority, judges could often
find themselves confronted with factors that point toward deference and
others that point toward intervention and thus, with a rationale for review
for simple unreasonableness. Formal abandonment of the idea that juris-
dictional quality or its absence determines the applicability of the
standards of correctness and of patent unreasonableness respectively would
create greater scope for the operation of this dynamic of convergence to
the middle in standard of review selection.
Finally, regardless of how many standards of review are maintained,
our study of lower court case law has led us to be concerned, like
MacLauchlan, that judicial reliance on the form without the substance of
pragmatic functionalism is likely to produce dissatisfaction with judicial
review outcomes, a lack of public confidence in both administrative and
judicial processes, and many lost opportunities, both for judicial contribu-
tion to better administration and for improved judicial understanding of
the contributions that specialized agencies can make to the development
of the law. We therefore support his advocacy for the adoption by the Su-
preme Court of a larger didactic role that would use substantive review
cases as opportunities for the Court to model the functional and pragmatic
approach for lower courts and, through them, for administrative decision-
makers. In other words, we share his view that it is time for the Supreme
Court to move beyond the articulation of the policy of curial deference, to
a primary focus on its coherent, thorough and consistent implementation
by others. We agree with him that one of the steps that can usefully be
taken in this regard is greater and more consistent attention to the develop-
ment and modeling "of practices that inform a pragmatic and functional
approach" and that, "show how the pragmatic and functional approach
works together with an ethos of justification. '' 257 Arguably, recent deci-
257. MacLauchlan, supra note 1 at 298 [emphasis in the original].
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sions of the Court suggest that this advice is already being taken and acted
upon.258 Perhaps what this study indicates is that, to be fully successful,
such a shift in focus needs to pay as much attention to the different institu-
tional capacities of different courts as it has in the past paid to the different
institutional capacities of courts and administrative decision-makers.
258. Chieu, supra note 74; Ryan, supra note 8; Dr. Q., supra note 16. See also Asbestos, supra note
140.
